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This thesis examines the recent foreign policy of Malta
within the analytical framework of international negotiation
theory. The island may be seen as a paradigmatic test-case
of small-power international negotiation strategy in that
Prime Minister Mintoff seems so far to have been unable to
repeat his 1971 success in negotiating. The Zartman Struc-
tural Paradox that prevailed in 1971 has yielded to a more
typical small-power situation as circumstances have changed.
Malta's current status of unarmed neutrality is unlikely to
persist.
Maltese decision-making and negotiations are examined as
resulting from several determinants, including: (1) Malta's
historical pattern of international relations; (2) the
island's economic history and prospects; (3) nationalism;
(4) the personal characteristics of the Prime Minister; and
(5) the external influences exerted by other states involved
in Mediterranean affairs.
Mintoff 's Malta will probably pursue a foreign policy
of nonalignment with economic and military guarantees pro-
vided by Italy, and perhaps other West European states.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1971, Malta, an unarguably small power, only recently
(1964) independent, dictated terms for a renegotiation of the
British-Maltese defense agreement, including the total with-
drawal of British forces by 1979. This feat was a prime
example of the structural analysis model as conditioned by
the tactical use of power sources in an imbalanced relation-
ship.
Maltese Prime Minister Dominic Mintoff's avowed aim was
for Malta to assume a non-aligned role, serving as a bridge
of peace and understanding between North Africa and Europe,
a policy course still pursued today. In this new status of
unarmed neutrality, the economic void created by the with-
drawal of lucrative British defense spending has necessitated
the search for increased economic ties abroad. The Mintoff
regime has promoted proposals for a neutralization of the
Mediterranean, free of influence by either the U.S. or the
USSR.
In consideration of the loose bipolar character of the
international framework, and the emergence of ambitious lesser
powers, especially Colonel Qadhafi's Libya, Mintoff's policies
have and will continue to require a shrewd and careful nego-
tiating skill. The problem is apparent: can Mintoff's Malta
succeed?

This thesis will test the hypothesis that Malta's current
status of unarmed neutrality is unlikely to persist. This
status (the dependent variable) is arguably a function of
Maltese decision-making and negotiation strategy (the indepen-
dent variable). Maltese strategies are, in turn, presumably
influenced by several factors, including: (1) the perceived
historical pattern of Malta's relationship to great powers in
the Mediterranean; (2) prospects for economic viability;
(3) nationalism; and (4) the more personal and idiosyncratic
characteristics of the current Prime Minister, Dom Mintoff.
At the same time, Maltese decision-making will be conditioned
by the policies and perceptions of key actors in the Mediter-
ranean: the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain,
France, Italy, Algeria, and Libya.
An attempt will be made to assess the impact of all of
the above factors on Maltese decision-making, through the
utilization of an analytical framework presenting Malta as a
paradigm of small power international negotiation strategy.
This study will evaluate the probability of different outcomes
in terms of (a) Maltese preferences and necessities, (b) Maltese
negotiation strategies and options, and Cc) the attitudes and
perceptions of the key Mediterranean actors.
Finally, the Maltese case will be assessed in its signi-
ficance to negotiation theory in general, and resulting




For the first time in several centuries, the Mediterranean
is in a state of transition. No power or nation can truly be
said to have dominance over this sea. This fact is reflected
in the status of Malta, whose current government champions
Euro-Mediterranean neutrality. Historically, the power which
has controlled the Mediterranean has also dominated Malta; at
present, no nation dominates the tiny archipelago nor controls
the Mediterranean.
The seafaring Phoenicians settled the main island, naming
it Malet (Phoenician for shelter) in 1500 B.C., as they expanded
their trade-based influence westward. Several centuries later,
another Phoenician vassal state, Carthage, began to supplant
the mother-power's bases in the area, and absorbed Malet as
part of this process.
In 216 B.C., the Romans defeated the Carthaginians at Malet
and annexed the island for the Empire. By this time the Romans
were becoming dependent on the grain shipments from the North
African colonies, and thus, control of the Mediterranean was
a necessity in order to ensure the security of the trade routes.
2
It was during this period that the island was renamed Melita.
In 60 A.D., a galley carrying St. Paul to Rome was shipwrecked
on the island. St. Paul converted many of the island's

inhabitants to Christianity, and the church has enjoyed an
uninterrupted and preeminent position in Maltese domestic
3
events ever since. With the division of the Empire in 395
A.D., Malta was assigned to the eastern half which was to be
4
administered by Constantinople.
As Roman power waned, Malta fell to succeeding powers.
The Arabs were the immediate successors to Roman rule as they
expanded from North Africa to fill the void created by the
deterioration of European power and unity. The Arabs gave
Malta her present name.
In 1091 A.D., Count Roger of Normandy secured the islands
from the Arabs as European Christians pushed the Moslems back
into North Africa. In 1120, Count Roger's second son was
crowned Roger I of Sicily, and Malta was passed on to the
Sicilian throne through the Normans and Aragonese. In 1530,
the Holy Roman Emporer, Charles V of Spain, ceded the island
to the Order of the Knights Hospitaler of St. John of
Jerusalem.
The Knights constructed extensive fortifications on the
island (most of which still stand today) , enabling Malta to
serve as a Christian citadel capable of resisting attacks by
the Ottoman Turks and the Barbary Pirates. The Turkish siege
in 156'5 was particularly determined, but ended in a decisive
defeat to the Turks, in part because of Spanish and Sicilian
7
support of the island. European Christendom was convinced
even then of the importance of Malta to the security of the
southern flank of its civilization.
10

The Knights' rule in Malta had fallen into a state of
inner decay and corruption by the latter half of the eighteenth
century. Infiltrated by French sympathizers and on the brink
of financial ruin, the Order's Grand Master Hompesch surren-
dered to Napoleon in June 1798, and the Order's membership
scattered to the patronage and protection of the various
European courts.
The Knights had oppressed the Maltese in the waning years
of their rule, and, as a result, the natives were glad to see
the Order depart the island, and received the French as liber-
9
ators. However, despite Napoleon's promises of freedom and
prosperity, French rule placed heavy burdens upon the Maltese,
including excessive taxation, disrespect for local customs and
religion, food shortages, and local inflation. In September
1798, the population revolted after the French attempted to
auction off some local church property. In mid-September,
Maltese envoys appealed to King Ferdinand of Naples for aid,
and hailed down the passing flagship of Britain's Lord Nelson.
Nelson blockaded the island, gave the Maltese a portion of his
fleet's provisions and weapons, and joined in their deputation
to King Ferdinand in late October. The King was reluctant,
but Nelson persuaded him that the island was desired by the
Russians. Nelson assured the King that England, having
recently acquired Minorca, did not desire Malta. Nelson's
warning of Russian interest was reinforced by rumors that a
Russian fleet was transiting the Dardanelles, bound for Malta,
11

and of a Russian army marching toward the Adriatic. It was
reported that the Tsar intended to restore the Knights of
St. John to their former position in Malta with the aid of a
3,000-man army led by Prince Dmitri Volkonskiy.
King Ferdinand was finally persuaded to provide aid, but
it was offered in only token amounts. The Maltese began
appealing to the King of England to claim the island, and,
indeed, tried to convince British troops to raise the Union
Jack over the island. In the spring of 1800, British troops
from Minorca reinforced the Maltese rebels, and by September
of that year, the French garrison surrendered to the blockade.
Lord Nelson, calling Malta a "most important outwork to
India", assumed sovereignty of the island on behalf of the
British Crown, declaring that Great Britain should never give
up the island. Under the Treaty of Paris, 1814, (Article 7)
the island of Malta" and its dependencies shall belong in full
rights and sovereignty to his Britannic Majesty."
Great Britain did retain Malta as a Crown possession until
1964, and maintained a military presence on the island until
1979. Malta was developed as the main base for the British
Mediterranean fleet, due in large measure to the fine dockyard
facilities which date back to the 1560' s. The dockyards and
Naval Hospital served the Royal Navy admirably, especially in
both world wars. In World War I, when Malta was known as the
"nurse of the Mediterranean", casualties under care at the
Naval Hospital sometimes numbered up to ten thousand, and the
12

dockyards were operated around the clock. During the Second
World War, the British maintained possession of Malta, despite
fierce German and Italian efforts to remove this Allied toe-
hold in the Mediterranean.
In the postwar period, Malta suffered the fate of other
overseas British bases as a result of the British White Paper
of 1957, which called for a steady drawing-down of the world-
wide network of Imperial possessions due to budgetary con-
straints. In 1959, the dockyards were passed from Admiralty
control to commercial control, and in 1964, Malta became an
independent member of the British Commonwealth. Simultaneously,
a treaty establishing British and NATO rights to use Maltese
military facilities for a ten-year period was concluded.
Prior to the expiration of the 1964 agreement, in 1971, Malta
forced the negotiation of a new treaty concerning military
facilities usage, designed to obtain increased British aid in
weaning the economy from dependence upon Crown defense expendi-
tures, prior to a final British withdrawal in 1979. Britain
did withdraw all of her forces by the spring of 1979, and in
the intervening year and a half, Prime Minister Mintoff has
made it clear that he intends to attempt to steer a middle
course between the strategic maneuverings of the USSR and NATO.
With this historical background, we can now turn to a




The major Maltese islands of Malta, Gozo and Comino
measure approximately 315.5 square kilometers (121 . 3 square
miles), and Malta, the largest island, is 27.3 km. long by
1214.5 km. wide (17 mi. by 8 mi.). However, Malta's diminu-
tive size is overshadowed by her location, in the center of
the narrow gap separating the eastern and western basins of
the Mediterranean, 93 km. (58 mi.) south of Sicily and 288
km. (180 mi.) from the North African coastline. From this
position, the island could serve as a base for surface sorties
against lines of communication, and aircraft with a mere 200-
mile radius of operations could patrol the entire Mediterranean
13
gap from the Straits of Messina to the North African coastline.
In either case, Malta could serve to sponsor operations de-
signed to sever the passage between the eastern and western
Mediterranean basins.
Malta offers natural deepwater harbors, repair depots,
a well-trained labor force and underground fuel and ammunition
stores facilities. Former RAF airbase facilities exist at
Luqua, staffed by British-trained Maltese administrators and
14
controllers.
Malta is not self-sufficient; if the North African and
Italian territories were hostile to the island, resupply
would necessarily be dependent on long, exposed tranists.
During World War II, Britain did effectively resupply Malta
in the face of Axis foes who held both Italy and North Africa,
14

although the effort was costly in terms of both men and
material. British air and sea forces based at Malta sank
over half of the supplies destined for Rommel's Afrika Korps,
and succeeded in making the Axis maintenance of the supply-
lines out of Italy an exhaustive and expensive task.
The security of the lines of communication between the
two Mediterranean basins is important for several reasons -
above all, because of the transport of oil from the Middle
East to Europe via the Suez Canal, and the right of access
to the Canal itself. The potential consequences of restricting
or denying the flow of this vital strategic and commercial
resource to the Western nations have become uncomfortably
evident in the last decade.
Israel, Greece and Turkey are dependent in varying degree
on the Mediterranean Sea routes. Israel is alone among hostile
Arab neighbors (except for Egypt) in the Middle East. As
illustrated during the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, Israeli
lifelines in time of conflict are almost entirely dependent
upon American freedom of passage in the Mediterranean. Israel
has no overland resupply available, and no benefactor as
committed or strong as the U.S. Greece and Turkey are isolated
from the rest of the NATO nations, and, along with Italy,
17
would depend upon sea lines for 90% of their wartime supplies.
Western conventional and nuclear naval forces constitute
the final important justification for ensuring freedom of
access to the eastern Mediterranean. The presence of the
15

forward deployed aircraft carriers and SSBNs of the Sixth
Fleet serve as a constant strategic problem for the Soviet
Union, and represent a major factor in the strength of NATO's
southern flank.
It has been argued by several sources that the value of
Malta is neutralized as long as one can operate out of Italian
and Sicilian bases, from whence the same missions can be accomp
1
8
lished. This argument assumes that NATO has complete and
assured freedom of action from its Italian bases. However,
the fairly recent political gains by the Italian Communist
Party should cause the astute observer to question the per-
manence of NATO access to Italian bases, and of Western
ability to use them as the Alliance chooses (all assurances
by the Italian Communists that they would not hamper NATO
operations aside). In any situation where NATO's Italian
connections were restricted, access to Malta would once again
become significant.
Even if the presence of NATO forces at Sigonella, Sicily,
were permanently assured (duplicating possible strategic value
to be gained by stationing forces on Malta) , there is an
equally important "negative" strategic value to be gained by
the retention of Malta as a sympathetic, Western-oriented
state, or, at least, as a truly nonaligned state. That, of




C. THE SOVIET INTEREST
The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron (SovMedRon) commenced
permanent deployment to the Mediterranean in 1964, and in the
following decade, her influence ashore increased in North
Africa and the Middle East. However, the latter half of the
1970s witnessed a loss of most of the Soviet shore facilities.
The 1976 abrogation of the Soviet-Egyptian defense agreements
has denied the SovMedRon the fine port and dockyard facilities
19
she once enjoyed in Egypt. The Soviets are once again depen-
dent upon sea lines of supply stretching back to the Black Sea
ports and passing through the Dardanelles, and are thus some-
what inhibited by the Montreux Convention and Turkey's member-
ship in NATO.
Limited port facilities are available to the Soviets in
Latakia (in Syria), and at commercial facilities in Yugoslavia,
but the major maintenance and resupply effort is accomplished
at the Soviet anchorages in international waters: Kithara in
the Aegean, the Gulf of Hammament off Tunisia, the Hurd Bank
off Malta, the Gulf of Sirte off Libya, and the Alboran Islands
20
off the Straits of Gibraltar. In addition to material dif-
ficulties encountered in supporting the SovMedRon, the loss
of land bases has denied the Soviets the ability to provide
air cover to their fleet. Of somewhat lesser importance, the
morale of Soviet sailors is suffering due to the unrelieved
21
routine of deployed shipboard life.
17

The strategic virtues of Malta are therefore perhaps even
more important to the Soviets than they are to NATO: location
astride the mid-Mediterranean choke point, port and air facil-
ities, and proximity to the North African coastline. A
Soviet presence on Malta would be invaluable to the SovMedRon
in countering the NATO presence in the Mediterranean and would
serve as a counterweight to NATO's Italian facilities. In addi-
tion to hosting the Soviets' extensive conventional/nuclear
submarine fleet, the island could be used to host buoyed or
submerged acoustic detection systems designed to inform the
22Soviets of the passage of U.S. SSBN's. This submarine/moored
detection capability would give the Soviets a valuable advan-




A. THE MALTESE ECONOMY
One of the major determinants for Maltese politics in
the past several decades has been the economy. A few basic
demographic facts should be mentioned at the outset.
At the close of 1978, Malta's population was 327,407,
representing a population density of 1,036 persons per square
kilometer (2,695 per square mile) , the highest population
2density in Europe and the Mediterranean except for Gibraltar.
3
This population boasts a literacy rate of over 90%
,
and only
about 6% of the labor force is engaged in agriculture and
4fishing. Cultivable land claims about 40% of the total land
area of the archipelago, yet approximately 80% of the food
consumed annually is imported , a fact hardly surprising in
light of the high population density. Small amounts of pro-
duce (mainly potatoes and onions) are exported, but the main
resources of the islands are its deepwater harbors and labor
force. The only proven mineral resource is globegerina lime-
stone. Oil is believed to exist in offshore deposits in the
southern portion of Malta's shelf, but as will be discussed
in Chapter V, disagreements with Libya have delayed exploratory
drilling.
Malta thus has a large labor force, the majority of which




The actual patterns of employment depend largely upon a
number of historical accidents. The economy has been service-
oriented for over four centuries, with the balance of trade
deep in the minus column, compensated only by a balance of
payments receiving large injections of foreign capital.
The Knights of the Order of St. John brought to Malta in
71530 great wealth and "power dependent on external wealth."
The local population turned to trades related to serving the
needs of the Knights rather than developing a self-supporting
productive base. Agriculture continued as a primary occupa-
tion until the 1870s, through the mid-point of British rule.
The British inherited the dockyard system begun by the Knights,
and the Admiralty soon made the Maltese port of Valletta the
main base for the Imperial Mediterranean Fleet. The dock-
yards and other sectors of the British defense establishment
on the island became the main employers of Maltese labor, a
situation which accelerated to the point of crippling the
agricultural sector after the opening of the Suez Canal in
1869. As they absorbed local labor, the British suppressed
entrepreneurship by discouraging the development of a private,
o
indigenous industrial sector : in addition, until 1959, when
the Admiralty passed control of the dockyards to a private
firm, no Maltese employee was promoted to a rank higher than
9foreman. By 1912 the situation was such that a Royal Com-
mission reported that the local labor force was fully geared
to the service of the Imperial government and that Maltese
20

prosperity was precarious and artificial. Cotton growing,
the leading industry of the nineteenth century, which employed
20.2% of the labor force in 1861, disappeared, and while 42%
of the labor force was engaged in manufacturing in 1861, this
figure had decreased to 211 by 1957.
The dockyards reached a peak of activity during the Second
12World War, employing over 12,000 laborers. However, in the
postwar period, concern emerged over rebuilding a viable local
commercial productive base. Malta was not included in the
Marshall Plan program, but the British made a £32 million grant
13to Malta to aid in reconstruction of war damage. This pro-
gram, run on a decreasing annual payment basis, was exhausted
by early 1960. In 1957, the release of the British White
Paper on Defense called for a gradual rundown of the military
facilities on Malta as part of the larger plan for the gradual
withdrawal from selected overseas bases. This event confirmed
the worst fears of many Maltese, including Dominic Mintoff,
the leader of the Malta Labour Party (MLP) , that Malta could
not count on the British military expenditures indefinitely,
and that the island needed to develop activities to counter-
act the effects of fluctuations in defense spending, and to
provide a basis for growth independent of the defense sector.
Mintoff had become the Maltese Prime Minister when the MLP
won the 1955 elections, and he fought vigorously for full
integration with the United Kingdom, desiring to permanently
connect Malta with its financial resources and social benefits.
21

As will be discussed later, Mintoff's integration plan
failed, and he resigned in 1958.
In 1959, the dockyards were turned over to commercial
interests, but with an Admiralty guarantee to ensure the
employment of 7,000 workers for the next three years. The
enormity of Malta's dependence on the British military sector
during this period was evident in that in 1959 it accounted
for over 25% of her labor force, 20% of her GNP, and 60% of
14her foreign exchange earnings. Also in 1959, Malta embarked
on her first five-year plan, supported by a £ 29 million grant
for Great Britain.
The Nationalist Party was in power when Malta became
independent in 1964. The Nationalist diversification program
was three-pronged: to stimulate investment, attract tourists,
and attract wealthy residents. Foreign investment was
attracted with various incentives, including interest-free
loans for plant/equipment purchases, government-built fac-
tories on industrial estates at low rental rates, income-tax-
free profits for ten years, and exemptions from import duties
17
on raw materials and equipment. The Nationalist Party was
openly pro-British, and thus most of the takers in all three
sectors of its program were British. The cheap labor and
financial incentives in Malta attracted British industry.
British tourists were at the time (1966-1970) restricted by
law to fixed spending limits outside of the so-called
Sterling Area, but Malta was in the Sterling Area, thus
22

proving an attractive holiday spot. Income tax incentives
encouraged prospective British retires to settle down in Malta.
Concurrent with independence in 1964, a ten-year mutual
defense treaty was signed by Great Britain and Malta. The
pact included a British agreement to provide £51 million in
aid during the ten year period. Article 6 of the defense pact
specified that no changes were to be made in the level of
British military activity of such a degree as to affect the
Maltese economy without prior consultation with the Maltese
government. The £51 million grant was to be distributed on a
75% gift/25% loan ratio for the first five years, with the gift/
loan ratio for the latter five years to be negotiated at a
later date.
The Nationalist Government's economic programs began to
unravel by the 1969-1970 period, unfortunately just prior to
elections. The defense treaty proved the first problems, as
Great Britain commenced an acceleration of the planned rundown
of defense activity on the island in 1966, apparently without
prior consultation with the Maltese. The Maltese government
claimed that it had not been consulted about the rundown, but
was forced to abandon its position when the British threatened
to withhold assistance payments if the Maltese continued to
complain. In 1967, the Suez Canal was closed, cutting deeply
into Mediterranean shipping traffic and thus lowering the dock-
yard employment level in Malta. The spending limits imposed
by the British government on their citizens traveling outside
23

the Sterling Area were lifted in January 1970, and the tourism
and real estate industries in Malta suffered as a result.
The influx of British tourists and settlers in the late 1960s
had inflated the real estate market in a building boom that
19
tripled between 1965 and 1969. When tourist arrivals fell
off in 1970, the real estate market collapsed, and foreign
investment and industrial development declined as well in
1970-71. All these factors contributed to a rise in unemploy-
ment, from under 3% in early 1970 to S% in late 1971. This
dismal economic picture was a prime contributor to the
Nationalist Party's narrow defeat in the elections of June
1971.
Upon coming to office in the 1971 elections, Prime Minister
Mintoff of the victorious MLP renegotiated the defense and
financial agreements with Great Britain, obtaining a tripling
of payments to £15 million annually, and an agreement for total
British military withdrawal from the island by the spring of
1979. The MLP Government thus embarked on an economic devel-
opment path designed to reduce dependence on British military
spending. The stated national objective became the achieve-
ment of "sustainable economic growth and viability by a
diversity of relationships with a wide range of partners",
and the establishment of an "industrial society with a special
focus on the creation of dynamic and export-oriented industries
20
and on the development of the services sector."
24

The main tool for the Labour Government's economic pro-
gram has been the 1973-1980 Development Plan for Malta.
The Plan was designed to achieve a consensus between govern-
ment, labor, and the private sector for an overall design to
select target sectors to lead the entire Maltese economy;
however, the plan was intended to be flexible and responsive
to changing economic conditions worldwide. The original growth
sectors were industrial enterprises, ship-repairing and ship-
building and related services, with the main emphasis on
21increasing Malta's productive activities. In 1977, a
supplement to the 1973-1980 Plan was published, indicating a
redirection of emphasis toward developing Malta as a "center
where raw materials or semi-processed goods from distant
countries in South America or Asia may be processed and dis-
22tributed to other countries in Europe and North America."
One of Malta's secondary harbors, Marsaxlokk Bay, has been
designated as the main site for the new transshipment enter-
prises.
The development of a mixed economy in Malta has been
spurred by the activity of the Malta Development Corporation,
which provides governmental assistance to investors desiring
to establish industrial enterprises in Malta, including public,
private, local, foreign, joint and independent projects. The
mixed economy approach is an indicator of the Labour Govern-
ment's intention to become more closely involved in Maltese
society: this developing governmental involvement is explored
25

more fully later in this thesis. Governmental control was in
evidence early on, as the drydocks were nationalized in 1971,
and since then the government has partially nationalized the
Mid-Med Bank (ex-Barclay's) and the Bank of Valletta (ex-Banco
23di Sicilia) . Controls on the import and distribution of
essential commodities were recently expanded to include wood,
cheese, coffee, tea, fresh fruit, rice, sugar, tinned food,
24tinned milk, butter, meat, barley, cereals, potatoes and steel.
The present government advises that private enterprises can
25
"flourish subject to regulation in the public interest."
The MLP formed an alliance with the General Workers Union
(GWU) in the 1940s, and this alliance has strengthened over
the years; in 1979, for instance, the leaderships of the MLP
"7 fi
and GWU were formally integrated. This is a considerable
advantage for the MLP as in 1975 the GWU membership of 25,300
27
workers was out of a total unionized workforce of 36,200.
The Labour Government has encouraged the establishment of
workers' councils in public sector enterprises in order to
facilitate better labor relations. The drydocks formed the
first such councils after nationalization in 1971, and the
councils have since spread to various other enterprises.
Full employment has been a target of the present govern-
ment, and paramilitary labor corps have been organized to
contribute to public infrastructure projects while training
unemployed workers for trades. The opposition Nationalists,
however, claim that the labor corps merely provide a cover for
26

hidden unemployment. The Government is also thought to employ-
persons merely to decrease visible unemployment. In December
1978, Government departments employment stood at 20,600, the
labor corps at 5,900, and the British military facilities at
1,540. In September 19 79, Government departments employed
24,900 (a 251 increase in nine months), the labor corps had
decreased to 1,800, and, of course, British military employ-
2 8
ment was 0, the base having closed in March 1979. Certain
Maltese sources claim that this explosion in Government employ-
ment is really only a sophisticated method of hiding unemployment.
In 1979, the trade gap stood at 119.7 million, the highest
ever; yet Malta's foreign reserves were more than adequate to
cover the difference, and the balance of payments remained in
29
the surplus column, where it has been since 1971. Despite
the fact that the British left in 1979 (thus ending the annual
£15 million official rental and approximately £13 million
30
spent annually on unofficial local expenditures by personnel )
,
foreign exchange flows remain favorable, and Malta maintains
a level of foreign exchange reserves sufficient to pay for
18 months of imports.
Much of the influx of funds is a result of tourism- related
expenditures, now that the British services' expenditures have
been ended. These tourist outlays include actual tourist
purchases, ticket receipts from the public-owned airline
32(AirMalta) , ship repairing and ship building profits.
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The other main source of Malta's payments surplus has been
foreign grants and loans, the main source (aside from Great
Britain) in the past decade being Libya. The Libyan relation-
ship will be studied more thoroughly in Chapter V, but econo-
mic aid has included shares in Malta's Investment Finance Bank,
part ownership in several hotels, the establishment of the
Libyan Arab Maltese Holding Company (LAMHC) f a share of the
Marsaxlokk project, development loans at 2-3% interest, and
aid in water-boring operations, hospitals, and transfers of
33helicopters and trawlers. The LAMHC has been the coordina-
tor for Maltese-Libyan resource development, and has established
nine joint ventures so far, with Great Britain, France, Italy,
34Lebanon, and Brazil, as well as the two founding countries.
The Libyan aid has been in evidence since 1971, when Mintoff
came to power, and Libya's Colonel Muammar al
-Qadhafi''
promised "unlimited aid to my brother (Mintoff)" after the
British withdrawal. " From 1972 until 1979, Libya provided
petrol, diesel, paraffin and lubricant oils to Malta at Libyan
domestic prices, a significantly discounted price. Col.
Qadhafi desired that the petrol products be sold at the same
price on the local Maltese market, but the Maltese Government
retailed the petrol at premium prices, using the profits to
finance Government projects and subsidies. The concession-
ary oil arrangement was discontinued in the summer of 1979
amidst increasingly disturbed Maltese-Libyan relations, and
since then the Government has strictly controlled petroleum
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sales while searching for a new concessionary arrangement with
other Arab oil producers. Libya signed a £23million, four-year
economic assistance agreement with Malta in November 1979, but
in light of recent relations, the viability of that pledge
. . 37
is uncertain.
Other aid has included interest-free loans from Saudi
Arabia to help finance the expansion of dockyard facilities,
Kuwaiti loans for a waste recycling project and fisheries
38development , United Nations Industrial Development Organ-
ization (UNIDO) assistance, the refinement of Libyan crude at
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concessionary prices by Italy
,
and massive financial and
technical aid from the People's Republic of China for the con-
struction of Malta's biggest drydock facility.
Malta has been an associate member of the European Economic
Community (EEC) since 1971, when a Nationalist Government-
negotiated agreement came into effect. The original arrangement
established a target date of ten years for customs union (full
membership and no tariffs either way) , to be finalized by
negotiations at a later time, and provided for a 701 cut in
EEC tariffs against Maltese industrial exports, a 35% reduction
in Maltese tariffs against EEC goods (the imbalance supposedly
addressing Malta's less-developed, less-advantaged situation
vis-a-vis the EEC members), and preferential EEC treatment of
40Maltese agricultural exports. Negotiations concerning customs
union, originally scheduled for 1976, have been postponed at
Malta's request twice, the latest postponement expiring on
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31 December 1980. EEC associate membership has been very-
advantageous for Malta, both in terms of trade and financing.
In 1976 the EEC committed 26 million units* for financing pro-
jects in the economic and social development of Malta, 15
41
million units to be provided by the European Investment Bank.
The latest EEC grant will be £M1.3 million for technical assist-
42
ance and training projects in electronics fields. Additionally,
EEC countries take 75% of Malta's exports and provide 70% of
her imports: Italy and Great Britain provide 21% and 20%,
respectively, of Malta's import requirements, and West Germany
43buys about 36% of Maltese exports.
The Maltese economy has survived the loss of British mili-
tary revenues, at least for the present. However, this success
is conditional on the continued flow of funds to maintain
Malta's balance of payments surplus. The success in attracting
foreign capital is dependent in large part on the domestic and
foreign policies of Prime Minister Mintoff's government. The
tourist trade, energy supplies, and demand for Malta's planned
transshipment center are all dependent on worldwide economic
factors out of Malta's control. The situation is reminiscent
of the 1912 report: to a significant degree, Malta's economy
still seems precarious, her prosperity artificial. As Prime
Minister Mintoff's international relations are reviewed later,
the importance of obtaining funding will be obvious.
*A European Currency Unit (ECU) is the standard monetary in-
strument used by the- EEC. The ECU was cr-eated through the
combination of the currencies of the member states, with a
specific conversion rate for each individual national currency.
In 1974, one ECU equalled £M2.8.
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B. DOMESTIC POLITICAL FACTORS
1. Dominic Mintoff
A charismatic, strong-willed national leader can often
come to dominate or profoundly influence governmental policies
to the point where the policies and the man seem inseparable.
Dominic "Dom" Mintoff, the present Maltese Prime Minister, is
such a leader, and, as is usual in such cases, it seems few
are neutral in their opinion of him.
Mintoff was born in C ospicua, near the port of Valletta,
in 1917, the son of a British Navy steward. Mintoff s higher
education began at the Royal University of Malta, where he
was awarded the one annual Rhodes scholarship granted to Malta.
He earned a degree in architecture and civil engineering, and
returned to Malta in 1943. A story may illustrate the begin-
nings of Mintoff s fierce nationalism. His father was stationed
at the Auberge de Castille, a grand palatial building built by
the Knights. The Auberge was then the British Naval Head-
quarters on Malta, and the main entrance was reserved for
dignitaries and high-ranking officers. However, Dom also liked
to use the main entrance. One day, when his father admonished
him for using the front entrance and told him that the British
officers were complaining of young Mintoff s habit, Dom is
supposed to have replied, "Don't worry Dad, someday that place
44
will be ours."
Mintoff has been associated with the MLP since 1938, and
in 1949 he assumed the leadership of the Party. Discussions
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of Mintoff's negotiating style in the next chapter will reveal
more fully Mintoff's blustery, combative style, but a recent
incident in Malta can once again provide a clue to Mintoff's
quick temper. While addressing the Maltese House of Represent-
atives, Mintoff became infuriated by interruptions from an
opposition party Member of Parliament. Yelling, "If you can't
stop him, Mr. Speaker, then I will!", Mintoff charged the
offending M.P., having to be physically restrained from assault-
45ing him. The same source reports that Mintoff is apt to
respond to adivce with screams, threats, and a quick dismissal
of the advisor in question.
Prime Minister Mintoff ' s authoritarian nature, blended with
the MLP's socialist tendency to increase government involvement
in Maltese society, is showing signs of eroding the democratic
character of the island. On the one hand, Mintoff's defenders
point to Government achievements in expanding welfare programs,
compulsory and free education, Government-subsidized mortgages
46
and housing, free hospital care and cheap public transportation.
However, Mintoff's Government has alienated at least three
important groups of professionals in Maltese society: the
doctors, lawyers and educators.
In 1975, legislation was introduced by the Prime
Minister which rescheduled the curriculum at the Royal Univ-
ersity of Malta to resemble a vocational program, providing
for six months of study alternating with six months of work
in Maltese society. When educators at the University objected,
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he changed the name of the College of Art, Science and Tech-
nology to The New University and gave it control of most of
47the faculties and the library of the Royal University. The
Royal Medical School of Malta was also affected, and graduates
were required to spend their first two years of practice in
Government hospitals before receiving a license to practice.
Enrollment has dropped dramatically at both Royal schools,
both have lost their accreditation abroad, and have, in effect,
been disbanded.
The new requirements for licensing imposed upon Medical
School graduates, as well as legislation providing for free
hospitalization, led to a limited strike by the members of the
Medical Association of Malta (M.A.M.), which did promise to
49provide emergency care during their strike. Mintoff reacted
swiftly, locking M.A.M. members out of Government hospitals
within 24 hours and importing foreign doctors and specialists
from Libya, Algeria, Palestine, and Czechoslovakia. The
Czech doctors in particular are unpopular, reportedly due to
their inflexible, strictly scheduled, bedside manners. The
strike is still in progress at the time of this writing.
After the 1976 elections, the Nationalists filed a
complaint concerning irregularities in voting in one District.
The case was brought before the Constitutional Court. After
the Court ruled that the complaint was valid, Mintoff ordered
the Court dissolved and replaced with new justices. Mintoff
claimed that one of the justices had made statements maligning
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the Maltese Constitution during the initial hearing of the
case, but the dismissal of the Court seems to have been in
line with a 1958 pledge to free Malta of the grip of the
"legal fraternity who have turned the Courts of Law into a
"51
means for their own livelihood.
In addition to alienating professional classes of
Maltese, the Government has nationalized banks, radio and
television; the radio allows some time to the Nationalists
for routine party broadcasts. In November 1978, it became
illegal to use the word "Malta" in any name, title, or sub-
title of any publication, trade union, company or other insti-
52
tution without prior permission of the Prime Minister.
The Labour Government has witnessed a rise in the level
of political violence, especially during and since the 1976
elections. The violence has apparently been directed mainly
at the Nationalist Party membership and their offices, and it
specifically includes ransacking of Party offices, beatings of
known Party members, attacks on the person and family of the
Nationalist Party leader, Dr. Eddie Fenech-Adami , and arson
and vandalism at the offices of The Times (of Malta), a news-
53paper sympathetic to the Nationalist viewpoint. There is
some evidence that the police are not impartial in these
situations. The 1976 election campaign exposed evidence that
54
the MLP was exerting a degree of control over the police ,
while most mob crimes against the Nationalists result in no
police intervention or follow-up arrests. Some reports imply
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that Mintoff is unable to control the radical left-wing of
the MLP, that Party extremists carry out the violence without
his approval, while other sources claim that Mintoff is
moving toward full Governmental control through monopoly of
57the instruments of power, that, for instance, the Parliament
5 8has been made merely a rubber stamp for his policies.
The available evidence seems to tilt against Prime
Minister Mintoff, considering his autocratic personality and
penchant for exerting personal control. Whatever the case,
interviews with officials of the Nationalist Party reveal that,
once out of power, Mintoff would be charged with violations
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of the penal code. In fact, these same sources hint that
Mintoff might try to rig or otherwise interfere with a free
election process in 1982, when the next elections are due.
The certainty at the moment is that Mintoff does control the
society and politics of Malta to a considerable degree.
2. Political Parties
There have usually been a number of political parties
competing in the Maltese electoral process, but the political
horizon has been dominated by two parties for over fifty years,
the Nationalist Party and the Malta Labour Party. Both parties
can trace their beginnings to the latter half of the nineteenth
century, and both have been in and out of power through alter-




a. The Nationalist Party
The early Nationalist Party was strongly influenced
by the Italian Risorgimento of the nineteenth century, and
reflected a movement toward nationhood with aspirations of an
Italianized, middle class morality. In the interwar period,
(1919-1939), the Nationalists became embroiled in a conflict
involving all major sectors of Maltese society, concerning
linguistic and ecclesiastical differences. The Nationalists
led an unsuccessful bid to establish the Italian and English
languages in equal prominence in education and culture. The
Party fell under suspicion and disfavor during the 1930s and
through World War II because of widespread fear of the Fascist
regime in power in Italy.
When Dom Mintoff's MLP was in power from 1955-1958,
the Nationalists in Opposition were opposed to his efforts to
achieve integration with the United Kingdom, perhaps mainly
because of high British income tax scales.
In 1962 the Nationalists, with Dr. Borg Olivier as
Prime Minister, were elected to power, and this Government took
Malta through the early period of independence (granted in 1964)
,
but it maintained close ties with Great Britain, Western Europe,
and NATO. As described earlier, economic failures caused a 1-
seat loss to the MLP in the 1971 elections, and the Nationalists
have been in Opposition ever since. Dr. Fenech-Adami now leads
the Nationalist Party. The Party advocates a free market
economy, and has developed close ties to the Christian Democrat
36

parties in West Germany and Italy. The Nationalists are
oriented toward the educated, professional classes of Maltese
society, and continue to advocate strong economic and defense
ties with Western Europe, objecting to the present Government's
nonalignment policies as dangerous,
b. The Malta Labour Party
The MLP was formed in 1920 by a group of profession-
als of the educated working classes who were influenced by
Catholic social doctrine and British trade unionism. In the
1930s, anglophile, anticlerical and socialist elements began
to penetrate the MLP. In the linguistic conflicts of the
1930s, MLP pressure resulted in the establishment of Maltese
as the national language. In the postwar period, MLP support
was centered mainly among the dockyard workers in Valletta.
In 1949, Dom Mintoff ousted Dr. Paul Boffa as the
leader of the MLP in a disruptive struggle over the MLP's re-
lationship with Britain. While in power from 1955-1958, the
MLP lost a fight to integrate Malta with the United Kingdom.
With integration denied, the MLP turned to demanding immediate
independence, and began to develop contacts with the Afro-Asian
Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) , and fashioned a policy
of nonalignment and democratic socialism. The MLP was out of
power until 1971, when it narrowly defeated the Nationalists.
The major aspects of the current domestic and foreign policies
of the Labour Government are discussed elsewhere in this thesis.
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3. The Roman Catholic Church
The Catholic Church in Malta has the oldest, most
firmly established infrastructure in the island's society.
The Church in Malta, as mentioned before, dates back to the
visit of St. Paul. Since all conquerors, even the Arabs, did
not interfere with the religious habits of the Maltese, the
island is probably the only extant Apostolic see, except for
Rome. In 1913 it was claimed that the island had more
pastors per capita than any other place in the world. The
population is over 99$ Catholic, and all schools teach Cate-
chism. Even MLP members, if accused of being godless Marxists,
ft 7
claim that they are still good Catholics.
Church involvement in Maltese politics is a historical
fact. In 1775, a priest named Gaetano Mannovino led an abortive
coup against the Knights of St. John. In 1798, Canon F. X.
Caruana assumed leadership of the revolt against the French,
and later demanded that the British annex the island. After
annexation, in 1802, the British Government pledged to leave
the Catholic Church's privileged status unaltered, and that
64pledge was respected for the entire period of colonial rule.
In the 1920s and 1930s the Church was deeply involved in the
controversy over the role of the Italian language and the role
of the Church itself in local politics. In 1955, the Church
opposed Prime Minister Mintoff's drive for integration, fearing
that direct membership in the United Kingdom would threaten




MLP candidates were put under interdict during the
1962 elections, thus making a vote for such a candidate
tantamount to a mortal sin. The interdict was in response
to Constitutional amendments proposed by Mintoff which would
secularize Maltese Civil Law (then equal to Canon Law)
.
In 1971, however, the Archbishop and Mintoff apparently
arrived at a concordat, as the Church did not involve itself
in the election campaign. It is not known what arrangements
may have been agreed upon, but the Church has suffered vio-
lations of its status in the past decade. Mintoff has since
ended the paramountoy of Canon Law in Malta with requirements
for Government registration of all Church marriages, and has
made it illegal for priests to comment on any matter even
remotely political.
Currently, Mintoff is nationalizing the Blue Sisters
Hospital. The hospital was built with funds left to the
Little Company of Mary by a wealthy Maltese woman over 70
years ago, with the proviso that the hospital be turned over
to the Government if the Order disbanded. However, Mintoff
has discovered a clause in Maltese law specifying that an
outright gift can be for perpetuity, but a gift of use is
valid for only 40 years; therefore, the Government is in
f\ 7
the process of taking over the hospital from the Sisters.
Thus, since the 1971 campaign, Church influence in
politics seems to have come to a low ebb, and secularization
of society is creeping forward. However, the Church still
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remains a strong institution in Maltese life, and it is a
distinct possibility that the priests will again decide to
meet the current Government's challenges to their authority.
4. The Armed Forces of Malta
Malta is obviously vulnerable in an indigenous mili-
tary sense, the island's 1980 budget alloted 3.5% to defense,
mostly for pay and allowances. The remaining $1.9 million
will go for improving the quality of the small arms equipment
69in the military inventory. Malta cannot afford to establish
or maintain a force of sufficient size and armament to suc-
cessfully defend her territorial integrity alone.
The Armed Forces of Malta (AFM) are receiving renewed
Government interest after a decade of neglect. The AFM at
present consists of two 500-man, main force units, one of
70
which is primarily an engineering unit. The AFM's duties
are primarily anti-smuggling and anti-pollution patrols con-
ducted via patrol boats and helicopters, and control of
harbor traffic.
In February 1980, after an alleged violation of
Malta's territorial waters by British naval vessels, AFM
patrol boat units were instructed to commence a wider patrol
pattern, necessitating several days at sea for each such
71
new patrol. The boat crews refused the new procedures,
and it is not clear how the dispute was resolved.
At present, the Government is experimenting with a
"Task Force", an elite group of handpicked police and AFM
40

personnel, designed to assume the coastal security patrols
of the AFM and to provide internal security in national
72
emergencies. The new Task Force is headed by a former
Police Commissioner.
In an interview with a former Maltese Government offi-
cial, however, it was claimed that the Commanding Officer and
several senior officers of the AFM were pressured to resign,
and that a massive reorganization of the entire AFM is being
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conducted. The official interviewed suggested three possi-
ble reasons for the AFM reorganization: (1) possibly a
preparation for implementation of a recently concluded Maltese
Libyan defense pact; (2) a solidification of Governmental
control of the AFM by purging the officer corps of Nationalist
Party members; or (3) the emasculation of a possible source
of any plans for an anti-Government coup d'etat.
The defense pact with Libya was concluded in spring
1980, and exact provisions of the treaty are not known. Ru-
mors claim that soon after, Libyan security troops in plain-
74
clothes began appearing on the island. At present, as will
be discussed later, Libyan-Maltese relations are strained
and the future of the defense treaty is in some doubt.
The Maltese military is a very small, limited force,
and due to the current reorganization, the likelihood that it
will be capable of any meaningful political role other than
as desired by the Government is very small indeed.
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IV. THE 1971 NEGOTIATIONS
The 1971 renegotiation of the Anglo-Maltese Defense Facil-
ities Agreement constituted a landmark in, and possibly the
peak of, Dom Mintoff's career as an international negotiator.
The 1971 talks saw him employ tactics and strategies developed
during over twenty years of practice, and most notably through
three major confrontations. These precursors to Mintoff's
1971 success were the 1949 Anglo-Maltese talks on Marshall aid
and food subsidies, the 1955-1958 integration struggle, and
the 1962 elections and Constitutional debates through indepen-
dence in 1964.
A. PRELUDES TO THE 1971 NEGOTIATIONS
1. The 1949 Anglo-Maltese Talks
In the postwar period, the Malta Labour Party (MLP) was
headed by Paul Boffa. Dom Mintoff, however, was by this period
maneuvering to replace Boffa. Mintoff was building a personal
image of a selflessly nationalistic firebrand, hoping to con-
trast favorably with Boffa' s moderate, even-handed style, which
Boffa had adopted in order to ensure smooth Anglo-Maltese
relations and MLP unity.
In April 1949, the British Secretary of State for Colonial
Affairs called a conference of representatives of all colonies
to London to discuss economic problems. Mintoff, as deputy
Prime Minister, was chosen to join the Maltese delegation, and
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during the conference, he submitted a memorandum to the Colonial
Secretary justifying Malta's claims for aid under the Marshall
Plan. He had previously, albeit unsuccessfully, lobbied with
the Colonial Office for increased food subsidy payments for
Malta. After the conference, and following Mintoff s return
to Malta, Amiralty plans to lay a large number of dockyard
workers off were announced. Prime Minister Boffa and Mintoff
were dispatched to urge the Colonial Office to grant Malta
the requested Marshall Plan aid and food subsidies, especially
in light of the layoffs at the dockyards.
The Colonial Office's reply was that the Marshall Plan
aid request was under consideration, the food subsidies were
out of the question, and the layoffs would occur as scheduled.
Mintoff angrily asserted that the British were being callously
oblivious to Maltese problems, and that he "could not bear to
see his people crushed and humilated without taking up the
2
cudgels in their defense." On 2 August 1949 he drafted an
ultimatum addressed to the Colonial Office, which read in part,
Before the end of August the British Govern-
ment should consent to Malta's receiving a
direct share of Marshall Aid. Failing this
outcome the Malta Government would ask their
people in a national referendum whether they
wish to stay in the Commonwealth or throw in
their lot with any other major power that
offered economic aid in return for the use
of Malta as a base. *
The ultimatum was approved by all the ministers of the
Malta Government, and Mintoff submitted it to the Colonial
Office. The Colonial Secretary in turn demanded that Prime
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Minister Boffa, who had returned to Malta, should return to
represent Malta. Boffa returned to London, and on the advice
of the Colonial Secretary, withdrew the ultimatum. Mintoff
angrily resigned from the Government and returned to Malta.
Back in Malta, Mintoff organized rallies at which he
gave speeches extolling his own virtues as a valiant fighter
4for "Malta First and Foremost." He attacked Boffa as being
naive and easily outwitted by the British, and unable and
unwilling to stand up to Crown representatives.
As a result, in October 1949, the MLP passed a resol-
ution declaring Boffa to be "lacking in the necessary quali-
ties as leader of the Party and of the Nation." Boffa re-
signed from the MLP, but continued as Prime Minister. Mintoff
was elected as the new head of the MLP.
Thus, although he was unsuccessful in obtaining
Marshall Plan aid for Malta, the crisis of 1949 did enable
Mintoff to gain control of his party.
2. The Struggle for Integration: 1955-1958
In 1955 the MLP was again elected to power, and Mintoff
became Prime Minister. He had campaigned on a platform promi-
sing to seek integration with the United Kingdom under a
formula he had devised in 1950. Mintoff s plan called for
the admission of three Maltese representatives to Parliament
and the administration of all internal Maltese problems by the
Maltese legislature. The internal matters would include any




After discussions were held between Maltese and British
officials, it was decided to hold a national referendum on the
question of integration in Malta on 12 and 13 February, 1956.
Domestically, the Church and the Nationalist Party
were opposed to integration. The Church was worried about the
effect that integration with Anglican Great Britain would have
on the continued prominence of the Catholic Church in Malta,
especially with regard to education. Archbishop Gonzi demanded
on 5 February that a firm guarantee from the British Govern-
ment regarding the Church in Malta be given before the refer-
endum was held. Since all manner of official guarantees had
been given by all parties concerned, it was presumed that the
Archbishop desired an Act of Parliament. Mintoff replied
that the referendum would not be postponed for further assur-
ances, and the Archbisop thus advised the people that the
Church could not endorse the referendum.
The Nationalists, while quick to support the Church's
position, were also privately concerned about the fact that
full integration would possibly lead to disadvantages such as
exposure to the high British income tax rates. They thus
opposed integration in favor of autonomous Dominion status.








Although the Church and the Nationalist Party claimed
that the results showed that less than half of the electorate
desired integration, the British Government declared the
results to be in favor of integration, and initiated talks with
Mintoff's Government as to the specifics.
Mintoff initially demanded £8 million annually in Brit-
ish aid, and through negotiation, secured a counteroffer of
£6 million. In April 1957, with the annual aid amount still
unresolved, the two sides deadlocked over terms for reaching
"equivalence" in British and Maltese standards of living.
Mintoff demanded guranteed equivalence within twelve
years, with annual monetary contributions and private invest-
ment contracts provided until that deadline. If equivalence
was not achieved within the specified twelve years, he pro-
posed that the British Treasury assume the burden for the
difference with the direct cash grants. The British, however,
agreed only to work to achieve equivalence by helping to in-
crease Maltese productivity, but with no time limit. They
offered £5 million annually for five years to promote develop-
ment, and offered to pay one quarter of Malta's social services
8
*
and one-third of her education costs.
As these negotiations were progressing, the British
White Paper for 1957 was released. This White Paper announced
a cutback in military strength at colonial garrisons, including
that of Malta, and an accompanying decrease in defense activity




Mintoff, after the negotiation deadlock and the White
Paper revelations, made pronouncements promising to seek
independence if the British did not accede to his demands for
integration, and to ensure the alternate employment of any
dockyard workers laid off.
Talks resumed in spring 1958, at which time Mintoff
demanded that Britain: fund alternative industries to employ
workers laid off by the military services with £7.5 million
in grants and £15 million in loans; pay for the commercializ-
ation of dockyard assets not required by the Admiralty; and
provide a £4.5 million grant to ensure Malta's ability to pay
unemployment subsistence allowances at a rate equal to 851 of
9the domestic rate in Great Britain. British unwillingess to
meet these demands resulted in the resignation of Mintoff
s
government in April 1958.
3. The 1962 Elections and the Independence Constitution
Struggle
The period 1958-1964 was one of political infighting
among the Maltese political parties and the Church as various
formulas for Independence and the Constitution were hammered
out, and these issues dominated the 1962 election campaign.
The main combatants were Malta's Archbishop Gonzi and
Dom Mintoff. Mintoff had asserted in 1959 that the Archbishop
was interfering in politics, as illustrated by the 1958 inte-
gration referendum experience. Gonzi responded that socialists
(i.e., members of the MLP) could not be good Catholics, and
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that anyone who was against the Archbishop was against the
Church and God as well. When Mintoff attended a meeting of
the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization in 1961, an
organization considered by the Church to be pro - Communis t
,
the Archbishop declared that Mintoff and the MLP were opening
the door for Russian intervention into Malta.
The conflict escalated through the winter of 1961-1962,
with the Nationalists allied with and supported by thei Church
in the campaigning for the 1962 elections. Prior to polling
in February 1962, the Archbishop advised his flock that a vote
for any candidate not fully supportive of the Church would not
be a Christian vote. In addition, all MLP candidates and pub-
lications were placed under interdict, a spiritual punishment
one step short of excommunication.
The elections proved a victory for the Nationalist
Party, who drew 63,262 votes as opposed to 50,974 for the MLP.
Mintoff claimed, with some reason, that the elections had been
unfair, that the Church had influenced the vote with the collu-
sion of the Nationalist Party and the British Government. The
12British Government concluded that his charges were unfounded.
In the postelection period, the new Prime Minister,
Dr. Giorgo Borg Olivier, and his Government completed a draft
constitution for independence. Mintoff objected to the proposed
constitution, presenting his own so-called "six points" for
inclusion: (1) to permit civil marriage; (2) to strip the
Church of its powerful influence; (3) to remove the Archbishop's
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exemption from civil suit; (4) to amend the Corrupt Practices
Act to prevent the use of spiritual sanctions to influence
public elections; (5) to guarantee freedom of belief for non-
Catholics; and (6) to recognize Roman Catholicism as the state
religion, with a provision allowing parents to decide if their
13
children should attend religious instruction in school.
The British declared their intention to let the Maltese
decide on the nature of their own constitution, and planned a
referendum on the Borg Olivier Government draft constitution
to be held in May of 1964. The Nationalists represented the
referendum as (again) a vote which would determine the future
survival of the Church in Malta, while the MLP urged a "no"
vote for a constitution that they claimed would perpetuate a
state of Catholic tyranny over Malta's political affairs. The





The Nationalists claimed victory, and the Colonial Office in-
terpreted the vote the same way.
Malta, under the adopted Independence Constitution,
joined the British Commonwealth as an independent monarchy
(sharing the British throne, and thus yielding control of her
foreign policy to the British). Coincident with independence,
the two countries signed an Agreement on Mutual Defense and




military facilities in "peace and war". NATO allies could
also use the facilities with no restriction. Britain was to
pay a total of £150 million over the ten-year life of the treaty,
with a 75%/25% ratio of grant to loan for the first five years,
and the ratio to be renegotiated at the beginning of the second
five year period.
Mintoff visited Moscow soon after independence, promi-
sing to seek Russian aid when the MLP returned to power. He
branded the entire independence process as a sham imposed by
Great Britain, with the British retaining the power, keeping
the base, and paying far less than they would have been willing
to pay considering Malta's strategic importance. He would
get his chance to prove his claims in 1971.
B. THE 1971 NEGOTIATIONS
For reasons described in Chapter III, in the elections of
June 1971 the Malta Labour Party won the majority of seats, and
Dom Mintoff was Prime Minister again. His primary goal, enun-
ciated time and time again in the election campaign, was to
make the British "pay through the nose" for the use of Malta's
military facilities.
Mintoff swiftly began asserting his authority and making
his intentions clear. The day after he was sworn into office
by the British Governor General of Malta, Sir Maurice Dorman,
he dismissed Sir Maurice and replaced him with a Maltese. He
fired the British police chief, an old political enemy. He
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ordered the dockyards nationalized, and declared that, in light
of Britain's unauthorized acceleration of the rundown of her
facilities usage in 1966, the 1964 Mutual Defense and Assist-
ance Treaty was null and void. If the British wanted to stay,
they would have to pay more. In addition, he asked the U.S.
Sixth Fleet to suspend port calls in Malta "pending revision
17
of general agreements."
The Commander, Combined NATO Naval Forces, Mediterranean,
Italian Navy Admiral Birindelli, was ordered out of his Malta
headquarters by Mintoff. The Prime Minister claimed that
Birindelli was a fascist and had been interfering in Maltese
politics by accusing Mintoff of planning to let the Soviets
1
8
use the island as a naval base.
While Mintoff was causing consternation among the members
of NATO, he was making overtures to the Soviets and to Colonel
Muammar al-Qadhafi, whose Revolutionary Command Council had
overthrown the Sanusi monarch, King Idris, in Libya in Septem-
ber 1969. Qadhafi was, at that time, calling for a neutraliz-
ation of the Mediterranean, and was promising aid to any
country which would work toward that goal. Mintoff did make
verbal commitments to that goal at this time, and his entire
neutralist-nonaligned policy will be reviewed later. Qadhafi
19
reportedly contributed to Mintoff s electoral campaign in 1971,
and made a £1.5 million grant to the newly-elected Mintoff
s
20government. He also loaned the Maltese Government the




Mintoff claimed that the Maltese would offer their
"services to the one who pays the most except for the three
21
countries which we fear: Italy, the U.S., and Russia."
However, this message was clouded by visits with the Russian
Ambassador to Malta, Mikhail Smirnovsky.
Prime Minister Mintoff thus secured the attention of sev-
eral key players immediately. The British were uncertain as
to how much more they would have to pay for their facilities
in Malta; the Italians were concerned over Admiral Birindelli's
expulsion, and by Mintoff s relations with the radical Qadhaf i
,
since Malta is only 60 miles away from Italian territory; the
United States was concerned with a possible Soviet attempt to
gain a foothold in Malta should the British leave, especially
in light of recent Soviet Navy expansion in the Mediterranean.
The latter concern was prevalent: the average military-political
newspaper writer evaluated the chances of Malta becoming a
21
"Mediterranean Cuba."
With this background, Mintoff met with Lord Carrington,
the British negotiator, several times through July and August,
1971. Mintoff reportedly demanded an annual rent of £30 mil-
23
lion, while Great Britain would only offer £8.5 million.
In September 1971, Prime Ministers Heath (of Great Britain)
and Mintoff met at Chequers to try and resolve the disagreement.
They reached apparent agreement on a figure of £9.5 million
annual rent, a £4.8 million grant for development assistance,
an immediate British payment of £4.75 million as an advance
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of the first six months' rent, and Malta's right to obtain
bilateral agreements and financing from the other NATO
„ . 24signatories.
In November, however, Mintoff declared that the British
had misunderstood the Chequers agreement, that the £4.75 mil-
lion was only for three months, not six. The negotiations on
the final agreement stalled, and in December, Mintoff declared
that, if Britain did not make an additional £4.75 million pay-
ment by 31 December, she would have to withdraw her forces by
15 January. The British reiterated their position that the
£4.75 million was for six months, and thus paid rent through
31 March 1972, and that they would observe that date as their
withdrawal deadline.
As British forces began the phased withdrawal in January,
the NATO allies began to worry about the consequences of such
a move. Prime Minister Heath was convinced that Mintoff
s
domestic base could not withstand the economic disruption of
a full British withdrawal, and that if no further offers were
made, that Mintoff would give in at the last moment. However,
President Nixon was convinced that the British were risking
the loss of Malta to the Soviets, and that such a loss would
be a serious diplomatic and political setback for the West.
He therefore proposed that NATO supplement the British pay-
25
ments in order to retain the base rights. As put by then-
U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Zumwalt, "we
ought to pay a little more blackmail. .. rather than risk
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driving Mintoff too far leftward at this time." Admiral
Zumwalt urged his counterparts in the Netherlands and Norway
to convince their governments of his views as he explored
further avenues for direct U.S. aid. Admiral Zumwalt did find
that Malta was ineligible for Agency for International Devel-
opment assistance under law, as the only merchant vessel then
27
registered in Malta had engaged in trade with North Vietnam.
Italy also became a more active participant at this time,
inviting Lord Carrington, Mintoff, and NATO Secretary-General
Joseph Luns to Rome for a continuation of negotiations in
January. But from mid-January to mid-March the negotiations
occurred in an on-off pattern as Mintoff would make one more
demand, request one more payment, set one more deadline. He
2 8became known as "Deadline Dom" to NATO diplomats, and Secre-
tary-General Luns came out of one meeting shouting, "You never
29know what he is coming up with next!"
The British withdrawal continued toward the 31 March dead-
line, with a British pledge that once all the troops were out,
they would not be back. Malta's Archbishop Gonzi and Italy's
Ambassador to Great Britain tried to arrange another meeting
with the two Prime Ministers. Finally, on 27 March, with only
30 of the normal 4,000-man garrison remaining, Prime Minister
Mintoff accepted the final British-NATO offer for settlement.
The new agreement was a seven-year pact which specified
a £14 million annual rent payment, to be made jointly by Great
Britain (38%), the United States (26%), West Germany and Italy
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30(171 each), and Belgium and the Netherlands (II each). Only
British forces were to be allowed use of the facilities:
other members of NATO would have to make prior arrangements
with the Maltese Government. Warsaw Pact countries were denied
31
use of the facilities. In return for the earlier Libyan
grant of £1.5 million, Mintoff secured a British pledge that
the facilities on Malta would not be used to mount any offen-
32
sive operations against any Arab state.
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 1971 TALKS TO NEGOTIATION THEORY
The Maltese-British negotiations of 1971-1972 are an excel-
lent example of the Zartman Structural Paradox: the greater
the structural imbalance in a bargaining relationship, the
more likely it is that nonstructural elements will determine
33
the outcome. Malta (unquestionably a small and weak state)
was through the shrewd tactical application of her power sources
able to obtain her stated goal: a redistribution of the bene-
fits and profits accruing from her location and military
facilities
.
One definition of the standard small power that has been
put forward is as follows: a state which recognizes that it
can not obtain security primarily by use of its own capabili-
ties, and that it must rely on the aid of other states,
34institutions, processes, or developments to do so. In a
standard big small-power relationship, the structural inequity
gives the big power the overwhelming advantage. However, when
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the Structural Paradox is present, as in the Maltese case,
the advantages and disadvantages of relative size and power
are outweighed by other, nonstructural but vital, elements..
Thus, whereas a small power normally would expect to have
a correspondingly small amount of influence in a bargaining
relationship vis-a-vis a big power, the presence of the
Structural Paradox can grant the advantage to the small power.
Within a global, systemic context, Prime Minister Mintoff
read the developing changes in the Mediterranean and took
advantage of them. The Soviets were expanding their naval
presence into the Mediterranean Sea and obtaining port privi-
leges along the shoreline, challenging the concept that the
Sixth Fleet ruled the Mediterranean. Libya's Colonel Qadhafi
represented the rising impatience and power of Third World
nations in the area, (especially the oil-rich Arab nations)
which were beginning to cause new problems for strategic plan-
ners accustomed to working within the framework of a strictly
bipolar international system.
Mintoff was successful in large part due to his ability
to capture the attention and then the participation of the
United States and Italy, first by halting U.S. port calls and
ejecting Admiral Birindelli, and then through the subtle,
implied threat that he had viable alternative partners in the
Libyans or the Soviets if the British did not make him a satis
factory offer. Thus, a bilateral negotiation process became
a multilateral one, to the advantage of the Maltese.
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Prime Minister Mintoff personally conducted all bargain-
ing with the allies: therefore, his personality was a key
determinant in the conduct and the outcome of the bargaining
process. He had developed a reputation for being abusive,
unpredictable and uncompromising. In the course of his
career, he had become accustomed to issuing ultimatums and
demands for more money to the British, and, likewise, the
British had developed some experience with Mintoff.
Mintoff chose to follow a strategy of continuing negoti-
ation up to the final agreement, constantly raising his
demands just when an agreeable conclusion seemed imminent.
He utilized threats, warnings and bluffs to attempt to alter
the British and NATO expectations of their gains or losses
as a result of various choices, in an attempt to influence
their choices.
The British realized that Mintoff was playing a high-
risk strategy, that a full withdrawal from Malta would force
Mintoff to resign in the midst of the domestic economic crisis
which would follow. Therefore, Prime Minister Heath was
confident that Mintoff would give in first, and Heath was
determined not to raise the ante. The NATO negotiators were
convinced of Mintoff s unpredictability, however, and were
more willing to pay than to play the game, and risk a loss
to the Soviets.
The offered rent payments increased as time passed, from
£8.5 million to £9.5 million to £14 million, illustrating the
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tendency in deadline bargaining, where concessions tend to
be the greatest at the end of the process, as opposed to non-
deadline bargaining, where concessions tend to be greatest
at the beginning.
To recapitulate, the Maltese-British negotiations of 1971
represent an aberration in small power negotiating strategy,
that of Zartman's Structural Paradox. Possession of a per-
ceived, saleable strategic value {whether interpreted as
positive or negative) ; an undeniable domestic economic depen-
dence on external aid and service to external powers; mani-
pulation of alternative buyers; a negotiator with an unpred-
ictable and irresponsible reputation - all these factors
combined to provide Malta with the ability to force NATO to
triple the British rent payments for conditional use of the
island's military facilities. The next section of the




V. MINTOFF'S MALTA, 1972 - PRESENT
A. MINTOFF'S SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATING FORUM
In the past decade, Prime Minister Mintoff's foreign
policy has been aimed at securing new sources of direct
financial aid to replace the revenue that would be lost after
the British withdrawal from the island in 1979. As a vehicle
for his search for new benefactors, he has chosen to champion
the cause of Mediterranean neutrality with his own vision
of Euro-Arab relations.
1. Mintoffian Euro-Mediterraneanism
In January 1959, Mintoff made a speech to a meeting
of the Malta Labour Party assembled to discuss proposals for
the Maltese constitution then undergoing formulation. He
described an independent Malta with its neutrality guaranteed
by the United Nations - in his own words, a "Switzerland of
the Mediterranean." He planned to emulate the nonalignment
of Tito's Yugoslavia and Nassar's Egypt, and would seek
international funding in order to convert Malta into a cul-
tural and commercial bridge linking the Arab countries with
the European continent. Mintoff's proposals were not adopted
for the new constitution, however, and the concept was
tabled, but not forgotten.
During the 1971 negotiations , Libya's Colonel Qadhafi
vigorously expressed neutralist, ant i- Communis t , anti-NATO
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sentiments, and indicated a willingness to back any regime
which would join him in a nonaligned foreign policy. This
may be a clue as to why Mintoff made it a point to indicate
his own belief in nonalignment publicly. He did so in a
speech to to the Maltese Parliament in August 1971, indica-
ting that Malta would: follow a nonaligned foreign policy;
become an associate member of the EEC, but service Eastern
bloc ships as readily as Western ships; and accept business
2
and aid from whatever source offered the best terms.
The agreement reached in 1971 specified a seven-year
life for continued British use of the island's facilities.
In the wake of the British withdrawal, Malta pledged that it
would not offer either superpower the use of its facilities,
and promised to pursue a new status of political neutrality
and nonalignment, dedicated to becoming the bridge of peace
between the European and African littoral states of the
3Mediterranean
.
Mintoff envisions a regional bloc comprised of these
states, pursuing a peaceful, neutralist course of European-
Arab unity. He feels that such an independent bloc of
states could jointly persuade the Soviet and American fleets
to leave the Mediterranean.
...we do not accept... the inevitability
of their permanent presence (or) their
interference in our affairs. We are not
against NATO: we just do not have to be
part of it. Nor are we against the
Russians: but we would like them better




Malta has taken formal steps to become identified
as a nonaligned state, including joining the Non-Aligned
Movement in 1973 and the "Group of 77" in 1976, two semi-
official, third-world nation "clubs".
Viewing the island as the centerpiece of this new
neutral, peaceful Mediterranean, Mintoff's plans required
defense and economic support guarantees by neighboring states
in order to ensure Malta's continued independence and success,
Prime Minister Mintoff and the MLP saw two options for Malta
in this regard.
The first and less desirable option was for Malta to
negotiate separate bilateral defense and economic pacts with
any nation believing such action in its interests.
The second and preferred option was to secure guaran-
tees from neighboring states to defend Malta militarily from
any external aggression, and to aid Malta economically in
the post-British period. The neighbors desired were France,
Italy, Libya, and Algeria, thus forming a quadrilateral, bal-
anced system binding Europeans and Arabs to the protection
of Maltese independence. The four countries would support
Malta economically by jointly providing £M28 million per year
for five years.
This, then, was to be the new Malta: aside from the
small, essentially coastal-security-oriented Armed Forces of
Malta, the island would depend for its defense totally upon
neighboring Arab and European countries as it spearheaded a
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new Mediterranean regionalism rivaling and supplanting super-
power influence in the area.
The responses of the four countries in question,
however, as well as relations with other major participants
in Mediterranean politics, have been varied and discouraging
for Prime Minister Mintoff.
2 . Responses of Interested Parties
Of all the states concerned, the Libyan response was
the most promising, and is best understood in light of a rel-
ationship developed over a ten-year time span.
As discussed in Chapter III, economic aid from Libya
has entered the island mainly through the coordination of the
Libyan Arab Maltese Holding Company. Various training schools
for Libyans were established in Malta, and Libya trained
Maltese pilots to fly the five helicopters which the Libyan
Government transferred to the Maltese military. During the
1971-1972 Anglo-British negotiations, when British payments
were suspended, Libya financed the Maltese Government, a
7loan since repaid by Mintoff. Concessionary oil prices were
granted to Malta from 1972-1979, and in November 1979 an
economic agreement ensuring £23 million per year in Libyan
investments in Malta over a five-year period was concluded.
In March 1980 an agreement was signed which provided for full
9
Libyan cooperation in strengthening Maltese defenses.
Part of Prime Minister Mintoff 's ambitious program
for Maltese development included exploration for offshore
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oil south of Malta. The Libyan coast, however, is within 180
miles of Malta, and in view of the adoption of 200-mile econ-
omic zones by many countries during this period, a Libyan-
Maltese agreement on a median line of underwater territory
was necessary. Colonel Qadhafi proposed that the median line
be drawn so that Libya be awarded two- thirds of the terri-
torial waters in question, based on its greater degree of
coastal development. Malta, on the other hand, desired a
50/50 split. Disagreements continued through 1974 and 1975.
In 1976 Qadhafi agreed to submit the dispute to the Inter-
national Court of Justice, while Mintoff contracted with three
U.S. oil companies to make test drillings as soon as the
dispute was settled.
By spring 1979, relations between the two countries
began to deteriorate. The Libyans kept stalling on the issue
of the median line, and, during an address by Mintoff to the
Libyan Peoples' Congress in Tripoli in late 1978, several
Libyan legislators suggested to him that the Maltese convert
to Islam, adopt Libyan-style democracy, introduce the Arabic
12language, and convert the island into an Arab base. In the
wake of these ripples of disagreement, Qadhafi was the only
head of state to attend the ceremonies marking the British
withdrawal from Malta. With an imported retinue of 500
cheering Libyans waving his Green Book (analagous to Mao's
Red Book), Col. Qadhafi told the audience at the ceremony
13
that Britain was a common enemy of Malta and Libya: and
63

14that there was no place for Malta in Europe; that the two
countries should join hands to aid the PLO against Zionism,
a move which would prove Maltese neutrality.
In the period following the British withdrawal,
further irritations occurred. Qadhafi froze oil exports to
Malta in 1979 at levels exported in 1978, and later stopped
providing oil to Malta at the concessionary price. In July
1979, Mintoff, in a possibly related move, shut down a Libyan
radio station which had been operating on Malta with official
permission. The station had begun broadcasting anti-Israeli
and anti-Egyptian propaganda prior to the shutdown. Colonel
Qadhafi then began to indicate that he would restrict further
aid grants until he learned what Malta would receive from
other sources.
Libya had been joined only by Algeria in expressing
definite interest in the quadrilateral arrangement. On
several occasions the Algerians indicated an intention to
support Malta, most notably in a communique issued after a
visit by Algerian President Boumedienne to Malta in January
1978. 1?
The Italians and French, however, were unwilling to
join in any such arrangement under Mintoff s terms. In 1977,
the French ambassador to Malta reportedly informed Mintoff
that France respected Maltese neutrality, but did not feel
1
8
obligated to pay for her neutrality. Mintoff requested a




was refused. Later it was reported that France had offered
20
a soft loan for an unspecified amount to Malta.
Italy, meanwhile, had offered to continue the approx-
imately £2.6 million payment it had provided under the expiring
Anglo-Maltese agreement of 1972 for another five years, an
21
offer rejected by Mintoff as "offensive".
The Italian and French refusals to accede to Mintoff
s
demands prompted him to issue a deadline of July 1977 for a
response to his proposals. Failing a satisfactory reply, he
22threatened to align with the Arab world. The deadline
passed with no noticeable move on the threat. In 1978,
Mintoff declared that the French and Italians were communi-
cating "at best, vague and conflicting, at worst, arrogant
23
and humiliating" answers to his proposals. He set another
deadline of 30 March 1979 for responses, and when that deadline
arrived, he ejected the 42-man Italian military mission with
their 120 dependents, a move further straining Italian-
Maltese relations.
The other countries Mintoff requested aid from refused
his demands as well. In spring 1979 the West Germans refused
to consider direct governmental financial aid to pay for
25Mintoff s neutrality plan, but did offer a soft loan.
Mintoff tactfully responded by calling the West Germans "a
lot of Nazis".
The two superpowers have not shown any desire to
compete for Maltese favor. Private U.S. investment does
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contribute substantially to the Maltese economy, with 20% of
Malta's export earnings coming from the U.S. -owned Wrangler
27jeans factory. In 1978, President Carter communicated
possible U.S. interest in encouraging further private invest-
ment and in providing loans to Malta. Mintoff interpreted
2 8the letter as a commitment of U.S. loans to Malta, and now
claims that the reluctance of the U.S. to follow up on that
promise is a reflection of official U.S. policy not to support
29Malta's neutrality.
The Soviet Union, long desirous of opening an embassy
on Malta, has been rebuffed by Mintoff, who requires that
they provide concrete proposals for trade and economic assist-
ance as evidence of support prior to making a full diplomatic
30
arrangement. Mintoff has indicated that the Soviets have
never really shown an interest in aiding Malta, and that




Neither Great Britain nor Malta ever showed any
interest in extending the Military Facilities Agreement
beyond 1979, and relations since the withdrawal have been
cool but detached, with no direct aid requested by or pro-
vided to Malta. Trade relations are very good, and British
private investment and tourism continue to contribute to
the Maltese economy. In March 1980 a minor crisis occurred
when two British warships steamed within twelve miles of
Malta while on routine maneuvers. The British observe a
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three-mile limit for territorial waters at the present, while
Malta claims twelve miles. Although Mintoff threatened to
remove the George Cross (awarded to Malta in 1942 by King
George VI for the island's heroism in withstanding Axis raids)
from the Maltese flag in protest, the dispute seems to have
cooled off.
In response to the low level of interest exhibited by
the West in bankrolling Maltese development, Mintoff has
continued to threaten and chastise the West.
The point is that internationally guaran-
teed neutrality is one thing and nonalign-
ment is another, whereby a country can
very well be closer to some states than
to others and can even have links of all
kinds, including military links, with the
ones which it considers its friends. The
Europeans are unwise to ignore the fact
that in certain circumstances the difference
between these two positions could prove
to be of fundamental importance. 33
As to his approach for requesting financial support
for his neutrality plans, Mintoff says,
We tell them we are doing this for you. We
have a right to come to you and say you must
pay your contributions. We're not begging
you - we don't want to beg - but you must
pay. This is something you must do. . . in
your own interest. 34
Although he continued to threaten a complete turn
toward the Arabs, no offer other than the "offensive" offer
from the Italians was made with reference to direct cash
aid.
Prime Minister Mintoff 's abrasive style was reflected
in his prescription for full membership for Malta in the EEC:
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first, Malta must be allowed to continue her nbnalignment
policies; second, Arab countries must be allowed to join;
and third, Malta's economic ties with Arab countries would
35
remain intact. He also reserves the right, if Malta should
join on a complete basis, to quit the organization at any
time.
Maltese relations with NATO have never existed on an
official, mutually recognized level. The Naval Headquarters
and the right for NATO nations to use the British bases under
the 1964 agreement were arranged without any formal or definite
commitment with any Maltese government. In 1965 the Nation-
alist Government requested membership, but was denied even an
observer membership, in part due to pressure from the Scandin-
avian members of NATO. (The reasons for Scandinavian opposition
are unclear.) Since the negotiations of 1971-1972, both the
Nationalists and the MLP have indicated their intention to
stay out of NATO and any and all other military alliances.
NATO's official position now is that any facilities on Malta
would be redundant and that as long as Warsaw Pact forces
are excluded from use of the island, and it continues a
policy of nonalignment , the interests of the Alliance are
satisfied.
B. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES WITHIN MALTA
The effects of the British withdrawal have not been dramatic,
The current state of the Maltese economy has already been
reviewed in Chapter III, but a quick summary will follow.
68

Although the trade gap is growing (£M119.7 million in
3 81979, up from £M89.6 million for 1978 ), the foreign exchange
reserves more than compensate for that deficit. An unemploy-
ment rate of 2.81 and inflation of 10-12% are currently
39troubling the Mintoff Government. Unemployment has been
kept low through the use of the labor corps and the expansion
of Government employment, but the Government still considers
2.8% unacceptable. This is because the 1973-1980 Development
Plan goals have not been met (13,600 new industrial jobs
planned, only 8,652 jobs realized). The employment shortfall
is a function of the fact that industrial growth has not met
Plan goals.
However, per capita income rose from £M264.9 in 1966 to
EM651.8 in 1977, a real increase of 8.5% annually, and the
40GNP has grown steadily in the past decade. The biggest
industry is the tourist and service industry, however, and
the economy is in need of more productive industrial informa-
tion. Mintoff has indicated that he will require £28 million
per year for the next five years in order to further improve
the Maltese economy.
The Nationalist Party feels that Malta's historical,
ethnic, cultural, and traditional roots lie in Western Europe.
They view a pact binding Libya with the Europeans to protect
Maltese neutrality as dangerous, in that, if the Nationalists
came to power and tried to improve relations with the Europeans,
Libya might use that policy switch as an excuse to intervene
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41in Malta. The Nationalists thus believe in obtaining
guarantees from Italy, France, West Germany, the United
Kingdom, and, indirectly, the United States. They further
state that guarantees should stress the protection of Maltese
territorial integrity and political independence and not
her neutrality. They see neutrality as a judicial concept,
to be discarded by Malta when necessary to request military
42
aid from a guarantor nation. In time of peace, no foreign
troops would be stationed in Malta. However, in case of war,
troops of one or all of her guarantor nations could be moved
43
to Malta as necessary to protect the island. The Nation-
alists do not, however, advocate any attempt to join NATO
in any status.
The Nationalists also want full customs union with the
EEC as soon as possible. Although they emphasize the desire
to work and cooperate with all nations, it is clear that they
lean toward Western Europe to a considerable degree.
Until very recently, it seemed as if the only place the
Labour Government could turn for the type of aid they desired
was Libya. The Algerian Government lost interest in the
quadrilateral arrangement after the death of President
Boumedienne in December 1978. The French and Italians showed
little interest, as did the rest of the Western nations.
Mintoff could take what he could get from Western nations
(not much) and, at the same time, try to get more out of





Recent events seem to have narrowed possible outcomes for
Malta. In August 1980, Libyan-Maltese relations reached a
point of crisis.
In July 1980 Prime Minister Mintoff announced that the
Maltese Government had authorized Texaco to begin drilling
a test well on the Maltese side of the Maltese - Libyan median
44
line. Apparently, one of .the Libyan-Maltese agreements had
come up for renewal in June 1980, and at that time, Mintoff
had been assured by the Libyan Foreign Minister, Major Jalloud,
that Libya would submit the matter to arbitration by the end
of June. When that date came without such action by Libya
Mintoff decided to go ahead and drill. He stated that Malta
and Libya would continue to remain friends as long as Libya
continued to support Malta's neutrality and nonalignment
,
and as long as Libya allowed the Maltese to search for oil
45
undisturbed.
Texaco contracted the Italian energy corporation, ENI,
to drill a test well 58 miles southwest of Malta (Malta and
Libya are 196 miles apart at the closest points of tangency)
.
On 20 August, after the rig began operations, a Libyan sub-
marine and warship approached the drilling platform and
ordered the crew to cease operations and depart the rig, or
face the threat of force. The crew did cease drilling and
abandoned the rig, and it is now being dismantled.
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Malta responded by immediately expelling all uniformed
47
Libyan military advisors, and requested an immediate session
of the United Nations Security Council to consider the Libyan
aggression. Unfortunately, the Iran-Iraq war relegated the
Maltese-Libyan dispute to obscurity, and so Mintoff flew off
to Rome in search of help.
As the oil rig was dismantled, Italian warships and air-
craft patrolled the area on an around-the-clock basis, indi-
cating a strong concern about the crisis. On 15 September,
Malta and Italy exchanged letters of intent to sign a treaty
48by which Italy would agree to ensure Maltese neutrality.
Support to achieve this goal would include support before
the U.N. Security Council, opening of consultations if the
island's neutrality were endangered or violated, and the use
of force for the protection of Malta if both governments
concur on such a course of action. The agreement included
an economic package of direct aid, £11 million in credits on
49
easy terms, and technical assistance. The treaty will
remain open for other European signatories, such as France.
Libya has several reasons for not settling the median
line dispute. A similar dispute with Tunisia is currently
under negotiation, and a settlement of the Maltese-Libyan
dispute under terms not of Libyan choosing might prejudice
their bargaining position with Tunisia. Colonel Qadhafi also
has strong desires for hegemony in his corner of the Medit-
erranean, and has nothing to lose and much to gain by keeping
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Malta dependent on imported oil, thus giving Libya permanent
leverage over the Maltese.
The future of Malta seems to have taken a new turn.
Certainly the majority of Maltese, uncomfortable with the
growing Libyan presence on the island, will be happy to see
this rupture in relations, and will resist any attempt to
resume close relations. However, Mintoff is a fiercely deter-
mined, unpredictable, and independent leader. Based on his
past record, it. would be unwise to rule out a renewal of
Libyan-Maltese relations in the future, especially if the
Italian treaty falls through, or if Mintoff sees a new
opportunity to get a better deal from Qadhafi.
D. SIGNIFICANCE IN NEGOTIATIONS THEORY
Prime Minister Mintoff s eloquence tends to muddle inter-
national and historical concepts of nation-state behavior.
To begin with, Malta bears little resemblance to Switzer-
land. Swiss neutrality is a centuries-old and fixed diplomatic
concept presenting a virtual psychological barrier to invasion.
The Alps present a physical deterrent to would-be aggressors,
and the three groups comprising the Swiss Confederation would
have a hard time agreeing on a choice of sides in any given
conflict at any rate. In addition, Switzerland has a .form-
idable, population-wide militia-type army and a highly skilled
labor group, together with an industrialized economy. If
invaded, the Swiss could destroy the tunnels and passes in
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the Alps, thus denying an invader the major strategic advan-
tage in such an invasion. Malta has been examined at
sufficient length to make the contrasts obvious. The once-
proud and impregnable bastion of the Knights and Christianity
is no longer such. As one Maltese military expert has
stated, "Now, for the first time in its history, Malta is
defenseless."
The concept of guaranteed neutrality has a definite
historical precedent, though it is not cited by Mintoff. In
the nineteenth century, the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg
was guaranteed by the five Great Powers; France, Great Britain,
Prussia, Austro-Hungary, and Russia. However, such a guaran-
tee was and is conditional upon a balance of power among the
guarantors: without such a balance, guarantees would probably
degenerate into control of the neutral by the most powerful
52guarantor. In the Belgian case, the 1839 guarantee began
to deteriorate by 1870, when Great Britain had to secure a
promise from France and Prussia to observe the 1839 agreement
concerning Belgian neutrality. By 1914, the guarantee afforded
Belgium no protection at all.
Guaranteed neutrality also meant something very different
from Mintoff s current definition in another sense. It was
presumed that the recipient of such a status was being with-
drawn from world politics, that the political system would
53
operate as if the neutral state was no longer present.
Prime Minister Mintoff, of course, intends to pursue a very
active role in shaping events in the Mediterranean.
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Nonalignment more closely resembles the stance adopted
by Mintoff in definition and usage. It has been termed a
tactical principle designed to extract the widest range of
advantages from a particular type of power configuration.
As such, it is only viable until the small power is directly
threatened. At that point, the small power must seek support
from a more powerful nation. Thus, the idea that nonalignment
is independent of power relations is incorrect. The benefits
of nonalignment have been enumerated as: (a) ensuring free-
dom and independence; (b) keeping small powers out of larger
conflicts of no concern to them; (c) as a means of avoiding
alliances which make local problems more difficult to solve;
(d) a means of preventing the diversion of scarce resources
to military obligations; (e) and as a means of obtaining
foreign aid from both sides.
Albert 0. Hirschman's discussion of the relationship
between neutralism and economic necessity considers the
levels of aid available for different stances in alignment.
As Hirschman asserts, if a small state values aid and
independence, such a policy can realize maximum aid as long
as the superpowers do not penalize neutralism in their aid
policies (an approach which might be adopted in order to
prevent sudden shifts in small power alignment, and thus
corresponding shifts in the world power balance)
.
As illustrated during the 1971-1972 negotiations, Malta
was able to play the superpower rivalry in such a way as to
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maximize the available aid from the West. The Soviet Union
would not, and does not, desire to cater to Mintoff's voracious
appetite for cash, but the fact that the two sides were meeting
served as an impetus to Western compliance.
In the past decade, however, the level of concern in the
West over Malta's alignment declined along with the worry that
Mintoff would align with the Soviets. It had become obvious
that the Maltese would not enter the Soviet camp. Thus, the
operation of the Structural Paradox, so viable in 1971-1972,
ceased as Malta lost the leverage of Western concern over a
Soviet move in regard to Malta.
Prime Minister Mintoff was faced with a dilemma. He
desired aid, but no one was willing to give it to him, and no
one seemed to pay attention (other than Libya) to his schemes
for a new Euro-Mediterraneanism.
It is the contention of this thesis that Mintoff s nego-
tiating strategy had failed by the summer of 1980, and that
the conditions operative in 1971-1972 which combined with
his personal style to give him a diplomatic coup then have
passed forever. In the long run, the Mintoff style has
proved counterproductive. Western Europeans have grown tired
of his tirades, insults, and deadlines. Therefore, he may
have initiated the 1980 crisis with Libya deliberately as a
means of grabbing the attention and concern of his neighbors.
He may have realized that the Libyans could not permit him
to discover oil in the disputed waters, and he further
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recognized Italian concern over a dispute so close to their
shoreline. Once again, Mintoff seems to have been successful.
Although the quadrilateral arrangement seems to be a dead
issue, the Italians have come through with almost all which
he could ask for with the newly proposed treaty. On the
other hand, it could be argued that Mintoff simply was con-
trolled by events, and that he was (once again) relatively
fortunate.
On the Italian side, certainly the issue of oil served
to reinforce their interest in the Maltese-Libyan dispute.
57Italy currently obtains 121 of its oil from Libya. If,
however, the median line dispute were settled, and Malta dis-
covered oil on the seabed, her new treaty partner, Italy, would
probably be first in line to deal with the Maltese for pur-
chase of that oil.
It is interesting to note that for all of Prime Minister
Mintoff s claims that the Arabs were his true friends and that
the West was ignoring Maltese needs, he flew to Rome to seek
Italian aid when dire necessity arose. Another possible
motive for the break with Libya and the agreement with Italy
is that it, in a sense, preempts the Nationalist Party plat-
form as the elections of late 1981 begin to draw near. The
Nationalists proposed to drill long ago, they have consist-
ently decried the Libyan connection and called for a treaty
with a Western nation: in one short month, Mintoff accom-
plished all three objectives, albeit differently than the
Nationalists would have approached the problem.
77

Prospects for the future seem to be an Italian-backed
nonalignment-neutralism for Malta. However, as mentioned
and shown before, Mintoff is unpredictable and acts with
little warning. It is likely, with elections approaching,
that Mintoff will continue his current drift toward Western
support in order to complicate the position of the Nationalist
Party. If the MLP is reelected, it is possible that the
Mintoff Government would drift back toward the Arabs, depend-
ing, as has been discussed before, on the terms they offered
him. Finally, any Nationalist Party Government elected to





"From the East shall come the Punic heart
to trouble Italy and the heirs of Romulus,
accompanied by the Libyan fleet; the tem-
ples of Malta and adjacent isles shall be
emptied. "*
Dom Mintoff, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, realized
that Malta, due to the course of history, had a firmly estab-
lished service-related economy dependent upon external sources
of aid and grants. His attempts to tie the British permanently
to Malta in the late 1950s failed, and in 1971-1972, he
succeeded in a renegotiation of the Anglo-Maltese Defense
Treaty. The goal achieved was the extraction of the maximum
monetary benefit available from NATO and the British, to be
used to finance the redirection of the Maltese economy toward
more productive, profitable enterprises. As the 1970s pro-
gressed, Mintoff declared a nonaligned status for Malta, a
conscious decision designed to establish a bargaining posi-
tion from which he would be able to negotiate for aid from
both East and West, Arab and European, in order to ensure a
steady supply of outside economic and financial support after
the withdrawal of the British in 1979.
In the 1971-1972 Anglo-Maltese negotiations, Zartman's
2Structural Paradox was instrumental. The factors of the
perceived negative strategic value of Malta, and the American
determination to have it appear that NATO was standing firm
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in the early stages of Soviet-American detente, combined to
provide sufficient external leverage to Prime Minister
Mintoff to. allow him to overcome the structural inequity of
his position vis-a-vis Great Britain and NATO. As a result,
he was successful in his bid to triple the amount that NATO
paid for the use of the island's facilities.
Mintoff believed that the threats, insults, and deadlines
employed in 1971-1972 could be continued in order to wring
further concessions from the West. However, as the non-
structural elements (negative strategic value, worry about
losing Malta to the Soviets) lost their applicability, Malta
became just another small power struggling to survive. In-
creasing dependence on Libya, a situation which was allowed
to develop in hopes of frightening the West into action, did
not produce the desired concessions, and, indeed, became too
dangerous for even Mintoff to continue. Therefore, he pre-
cipitated a crisis over conflicting Maltese-Libyan claims to
oil in the seabed between the two countries, and then turned
to Italy for aid and protection. Italy, a major trading
partner with, and oil customer of, Libya, did not wish to
see Colonel Qadhafi transform Malta into a Libyan colony, and
thus agreed to aid Malta economically, and to protect her
neutrality with the force of arms if necessary.
Even prior to the August 1980 crisis, Mintoff showed a
movement away from unarmed neutrality. In June 198Q,
Mintoff signed a secret agreement with Yugoslavia which
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reportedly is concerned with Maltese defense. After the
Yugoslav agreement was signed, Mintoff announced that Malta
would allow foreign military forces to use the island's
military facilities if and when it was in Maltese interests
3
to do so. Later he added that the agreement would remain
secret, but implied Yugoslav contributions to Maltese defense
might be forthcoming by stating, "Suppose (the Yugoslavs)
give us torpedoes. I will let others guess. If they think
Malta has one thousand torpedoes instead of ten it is all the
4better because they will not come."
The exact provisions of the Yugoslav agreements are
unknown, but the treaty was probably a largely symbolic ges-
ture of solidarity with an acknowledged leader of the non-
aligned movement. The pending Italian-Maltese treaty is
public and specific. Mintoff, when threatened by the Libyan
challenge, flew to Rome, not to Belgrade.
Thus, for the present, it appears that Mintoff has aban-
doned a strict unarmed neutrality for a Western (Italian)
backed neutrality, even to the point of agreeing to let
foreign troops use the island's military facilities in its
defense, a departure from earlier stated intentions never
to allow foreign troops on the island again. No mention has
been made of any restrictions on the use of the island's
facilities in opposition to any Arab countries, an agreement
forced upon Britain in 1972.
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The significance for negotiation theory of the Maltese
situation is that Mintoff's negotiating style, his offensive,
abusive, deadline-related bargaining, has been revealed as
bankrupt. Arguably, the 1980 Maltese-Libyan crisis was
another Mintoff tactic to force Western concessions, but it
was a riskier, higher-stakes gamble in terms of Maltese sov-
ereignty than the tactics employed previously. If Italy had
not reacted favorably, Mintoff may have succeeded in precipi-
tating the erosion of Maltese sovereignty by Libya. However,
Mintoff has apparently profited from his gamble. But,
conversely, he was forced to turn to a more powerful, Western
neighbor in the face of a threat from an Arab nation once
projected by Mintoff himself as a guarantor of Maltese
neutrality, in order to protect that neutrality.
In general, then, Malta fits with Rothstein's definition
of a small power. The elites recognize that they must rely
on external aid to survive. However, Prime Minister Mintoff's
strategy in pursuing that aid differs from the norm of inter-
national relations. His strategy, though successful in some
instances, is dangerous and unsettling to the normal process
of diplomacy.
Implications of the Maltese situation for U.S. and NATO
interests in the Mediterranean are favorable. The U.S. has
undergone a period of retrenchment and readjustment of its
foreign policies. U.S. policies in the Mediterranean have
become less assertive and more contradictory. The policy
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aim of protecting the Western supply of Arab oil may conflict
with the avowed intention to support the continued existence
of the State of Israel. U.S. regional policy has become less
distinct as its past naval superiority in the Mediterranean
has yielded to a more ambiguous situation vis-a-vis the
Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean.
The Italian-Maltese treaty illustrates a willingness on
the part of Italy to contribute to regional stability in the
Mediterranean, as well as a recognition of Colonel Qadhafi's
desires for influence in the region. It is also a positive
sign for Italy, where the power of the Italian Communist
Party and the paucity of national defense budgets have been
perceived by the Alliance as factors contributing to the
weakening of the southern flank. The treaty may be a sign
of recognition on Italy's part of an ability to promote
Western security interests in the Mediterranean.
This may be the best possible outcome for NATO. A Libyan-
controlled Malta would have threatened the regional balance
in the Mediterranean, providing a springboard for Libyan-
backed terrorism against Italy and southern Europe, and
could have allowed a Libyan threat to the security of Western
shipping through the waters surrounding Malta (with Libyan-
sponsored but autonomous attacks on selected Western shipping





Multilaterally-guaranteed neutrality has been shown to
be historically unworkable, and Mintoff's plan was precarious
in the proposed combination of four states with quite dif-
ferent national characters: France, a champion of European
self-determination; Italy, a reliable member of the NATO
alliance; Algeria, a moderate Arab state; and Libya, a radical
Arab state seeking hegemony in the Mediterranean. This would
have produced a volatile combination at best, a four-way battle
for control of Malta at the worst. Libya would seem to be
most inclined to try to exert control over Malta; Italy would
be the most likely to try to protect Malta; Algeria and France
have shown little or no interest in any attitude toward Malta.
U.S. and NATO policy interests would best be served by
allowing the present course of events to continue. Although
Mintoff has preempted several Nationalist Party pro-West
policy recommendations, the fact stands that he was forced to
concede, by action if not by word, that the relationship with
Libya was a failure, and his campaign for the elections in
1981 will suffer for that failure. Subtle U.S. pressure on
the Western Europeans to indicate a preference for the Nation-
alist Party, to continue private economic investments at the
present, might aid a Nationalist victory in 1981. However,
any repetition of the 1972 events, where U.S. pressure forced
the British to concede to Maltese demands, and thus ensured
the success of Mintoff's negotiations, would be detrimental
to Western interests. Overt, seemingly NATO- inspired activity
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in the support of the Nationalists would be counterproductive.
Any support offered must be subtle and given bilaterally,
not multilaterally.
Although events of the past decade have convinced dif-
ferent observers at different times that Malta was destined
to become a Libyan or communist client state, recent events
have shown that even Prime Minister Mintoff perceives the
advantages of "nonaligned alignment" with the West. He may
perceive the ambiguity of recent U.S. policy in the Mediter-
ranean, but in the long run he certainly recognized the fact
that he can obtain a better deal from the West in terms of
real economic investment and protection of internal sovereignty
As long as it is apparent that the West, as represented by
Italy, desires to see an independent Malta, nonaligned but
free, Mintoff will probably continue to ultimately rely upon





I. William Zartman, The 50% Solution (Garden City:
Anchor Books, 1976, p. 121T.
CHAPTER II
Patrick Mangion, The End of An Island Fortress: Malta






The Catholic Encyclopedia , 1913 ed. , s.v. "Malta."




7James H. Lytle, "The Strategic Importance of Malta to
the United States" (Thesis, U.S. National Defense University,
1972), pp. 5-6.
o
Edith Dobie, Malta's Road to Independence (Norman: Uni-
versity of Oklahoma Press, 1967)
,
p. 6.
9Christopher Hibbert, "The Siege of Valletta, 1798-1800,"
History Today 23 (February 1973): 84-93. This reference was
the sole source for the discussion of the British annexation
of Malta.
Russell King, "The Changing Role of Malta's Dockyards,"
Georgraphy 281 (November 1978): 363.
Dobie, p. 6.
12Central Office of Statistics, Malta, Annual Abstract of
Statistics, 1978, No. 32 (Valletta: Government Printing Press,
1980), p. 3. !
86

13James N. Berry, "The Political Alignment and Strategic
Importance of Malta" (Thesis, U.S. Naval War College School
of Naval Command and Staff, 1970), p. 7.
14Clare Hollingworth, "The Soft Underbelly of NATO," The
Daily Telegraph , 8 February 1979, p. 18.
Berry, p. 8.
Karl W. Hoch, Jr., "The Luftwaffe and Malta: A Case of






19Charles Holley, "The Struggle for Bases in the Mediter-






Central Office of Statistics, Malta, Annual Abstract of
Statistics 1978, No. 32 (Valletta: Government Printing Press,
198) , Selected summary data page.
2Russell King, "Recent Developments in the Political and
Economic Geography of Malta," Tj idschrift voor Economische en




4Office of the Prime Minister, Economic Division, Malta,
Economic Report 1979 (Valletta: Government Printing Press,
1979), p. 11.




Encyclopaedia Britannica , 1974 ed. , s.v. "Malta."
7
B.S. Young, "The Maltese Islands: Economic Problems
and Prospects for Industrial Development," The Geographical
Review 53 (April 1963): 267.
g
King, "Recent Developments...," p. 259.
qy
Ibid.
Henry Collins, "Malta's Economy," The World Today 23
(May 1967): 181.
British Central Office of Information, Malta: Central
Office of Information Reference Pamphlet #63 (London: H. M.
Stationery Office, 1964), p. 17.








J. Dowdall, "Mintoff's Malta: Problems of Independence,"
The World Today 28 (May 1972) :193.
17Huw R. Jones, "The Backward Glance from Malta," Geo -
graphical Magazine 44 (March 1972): 373.
18British Central Office of Information, Malta: Independence




20Office of the Prime Minister, Economic Division, Malta,
Economic Survey 1978 (Valletta: Government Printing Press,
1979), p. 1.
21Department of Information, Malta Handbook 1976 (Valletta:
Government Printing Press, 1976), pp. 163, 166.
88

22Office of the Prime Minister, Development Plan for Malta
1973-1980 Supplement (Valletta: Central Office of Statistics
Printing Division, 1977), p. 81.
23 .
King, "Recent Developments...," p. 263.
24
"Malta Import Curb," The Daily Telegraph , 23 August 1979,
p. 17.
25Malta Handbook 1976, p. 164.
26Shakib Otaqui, "Malta: A MEED Special Report," Middle
East Economic Digest (May 1980), p. 21.
27
King, "Recent Developments..." p. 263.
28Malta Economic Report 1979
, p. 11.
29Central Bank of Malta, Quarterly Review, June 1980
(Valletta: Union Press, 1980)
,
p. 15.
30Neville Brown, "Can Malta Remain Part of the Western
Alliance?", New Middle East 37 (October 1971), p. 10.
31Otaqui, p. 23.
Central Bank of Malta, Annual Report 1979 (Valletta:
Union Press, 1980), p. 32.
33
A. J. Mcllroy, "Mintoff Looks to Cheap Arab Loans if




David B. Richardson, "Malta: The Rock That May Trip
Qadhafi," U.S. News and World Report , 23 July 1979, p. 40.
•7(1
Godfrey Grima, "Qadhafi Promises Military Assistance
for Malta," The Financial Times , 7 April 1978, p. 8.




5 development Plan for Malta 1975-1980 Supplement
, p. 61.
39Department of Information, Malta, Labour Manifesto :
"Forward in Peace" (Valletta: Government Printing Press, 1976),
p. 40.
40
Michael J. Mallia, "Malta's Relations with the EEC,"
Azad Perspectiv 8 (July-September 1979), pp. 9,11,15.
41




"Aid from Europe," The Times (Malta), 16 July 1980, p. 10.
43





Cal McCrystal, "Fortress Mintoff: Can Mobs be Curbed?,"
The Sunday Times (London), 2 March 1980, p. 8.
46James M. Markham, "Malta, An Oft-Conquered Isle, Seeks
a Few Good Friends," The New York Times , 10 October 1979, p. 2.
47McCrystal, p. 8.
48
A. J. Mcllroy, "Mintoff Sets Out to Be An Island," The
Daily Telegraph
,
17 September 1976, p. 24.
49
Manion, p. 53.
Markham, "Malta, An Oft-Conquered Isle,..."
51Mangion, pp. 46-47.
52Henry Frendo, "Maltese Political Parties (1880-1978),"
Azad Perspectiv 6 (January-March 1979): 46-47.
53Patrick Keatley, "Malta Suffering Erosion of Democracy
Under Mintoff, Opposition Leader Says," The Guardian , 6 November
1979.




"Not on Malta Police Patch," The Daily Telegraph
,
5 November 1979, p. 20.
56McIlroy, "Mintoff Sets Out..."
57Patrick Keatley, "Democracy at Risk in Mintoff s Malta,"
The Guardian
,
2 August 1978, p. 3.
58Markham, Ibid.




1913 ed. , s.v. "Malta."
f\ 7
The New Catholic Encyclopedia
,
1967 ed. , s.v. "Malta,"
by A. Bonnici.
The Catholic Encyclopedia , 1913 ed. , s.v. "Malta."
64
Alvin J. Cottrell, "Malta: The Future of a Naval Base,"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (October 1958), p. 34.
65Dobie, pp. 207-221.
66McIlroy, "Mintoff Sets Out..."
f> 7
"Mr. Mintoff Gives Go Ahead for Offshore Oil Drilling,"
The Sunday Times (Malta), 20 July 1980, p. 32.
f R
Gregory R. Copley, ed. , Defense and Foreign Affairs




"Defense Requirement," (Editorial). The Times (Malta),
31 January 1979.
70 Charles Latour, "Withdrawal from Malta," NATO's Fifteen
Nations
,
August-September 1977, p. 97.





"Task Force Duties," (Editorial) The Times (Malta),
30 April 1980.
73
"Defense Requirements," Ibid., also Interview with
Maltese ex-Government official.
74






































14Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Proposed Agreement on
Mutual Defense and Assistance Between the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the





"Malta's Political Switch Hints a Mediterranean 'Cuba',"
Christian Science Monitor , 26 June 1971, p. 1.
17
"The Cross Maltese," Time 19 July 1971, p. 26.
18 x , . .Ibid.
19 Interview with Maltese ex- Government official.
20
W. Howard Wriggins, "To the Highest Bidder: Malta,
Britain and NATO," Round Table 258 (April 1975): 184.
21
"The Cross Maltese," p. 26.
22 See "Malta's political switch hints a 'Mediterranean
Cuba'," The Christian Science Monitor
, 26 June 1971, p. 1.
or John K. Cooley , "Soviet Naval gains forecast if
British forces leave Malta," Christian Science Monitor , 31
December 1971, p. 1.
23
"Malta Takes Nonaligned Stance," Christian Science
Monitor , 16 July 1971, p. 2.
24Wriggins, p. 180.
25John Allen May, "Nixon Enters Malta Dispute," Christian
Science Monitor , 15 January 1972, p. 5.
7 ft
Elmo R. Zuonwalt, Jr., On Watch (New York: Quadrangle/







"Mr. Mintoff still waits for cash," The Times (London),
17 December 1971, #p. 7.
29Mangion, p. 35.
30Charles Latour, "The Withdrawal From Malta," NATO '
s




H.M. Stationery Office, Agreement Between the Government
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and the Government of Malta with respect to the Use of Military





34Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1968)
,
p. TT.
35Fred C. Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper §
Row, 1964), pp. 60-6T:
Interviews with Nationalist Party official, and ex-
Government (Malta) official.
37
Zartman, p. 12 2.
CHAPTER V
1Dobie, p. 193.
"Malta Takes Nonaligned Stance," Christian Science
Monitor
,
16 August 19 71, p. 2.
3Prime Minister Dom Mintoff , Speech to the Conference of
Progressive Socialist Parties and Organizations of the Medit -




Prime Minister Mintoff, Speech at the University of Athens
,
7-8 April 1976 (Valletta: Government Press, 1976), p. 17.
Department of Information, Malta, Labour Manifesto:
"Forward in Peace
,
(Valletta: Government Press, 1976), p. 58.
"One Island all Alone," The Guardian , 3 April 1979.
7
C.L. Sulzberger, "A Question of Timing on Mintoff
s
Policy," International Herald Tribune, 12 January 1977, p. 6.
94

"Libya Aids Malta," The Daily Telegraph , 19 November
1979.
q
Godfrey Grima, "Malta Pact with Malta Disclosed," The
Financial Times , 21 March 1980, p. 3.
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) , Western




13John Mizzi, "Maltese Weep as Navy says Goodbye," The
Daily Telegraph
,
2 April 1979, p. 3.
14Richardson, p. 40.
Mizzi, p. 3.
"Mintoff Shuts Down Libyan Radio Station," The Daily
Telegraph , 7 May 1979, p. 7.
17 FBIS Western Europe , 4 January 1978, p. Zl, and 19
June 1979, p. Zl.
18 Interview with Nationalist Party official.








FB IS Western Europe , 16 August 1979, p. Z4.
22
"Mintoff Sets Deadline for Cooperation," The Daily
Telegraph
,
2 May 1977, p. 8.
Godfrey Grima, "Mintoff in European Aid Bid," The











Joseph V. Micaleff, "Mediterrean Maverick," The Round
Table 275 (July 1979): 250.
27
Russell King, "Recent Developments...," p. 265*
2 8
"Report on Malta to the U.S. House of Representatives,"
The Times (Malta), 10 July 1980, p. 2.
29James M. Markham, "Premier says Malta must stay neutral,"
The New York Times
,




"Mintoff Threatens to Remove George Cross from Flag,"
The Times (London), 6 March 1980, p. 1.
35 FB IS Western Europe , 16 August 1979, p. Z4.
Otaqui, p. 5.
35
F B IS Western Europe
,
19 June 1979, p. Zl.
NATO Information Service, NATO Facts and Figures 1978




Report by the Committee on Defense Questions and Arma -
ments ,' Western European Union; Security in the Mediterranean :
Assembly of the WEU, 24th Ordinary Session, 1st Part (Docu-
ment 776), 31 May 1978, p. 26.
38Central Bank of Malta, Quarterly Report, March 1980
(Valletta: Union Press, 1980j^
39
"Report on Malta to the U.S. House of Representatives,"




41 Interview with Nationalist Party Spokesman.
42
The Nationalist Party of Malta, The Nationalist Party's
Views on Basic Foreign Policy Issues , Press Release, Pieta',
Malta, 29 March 19787
43Interview with Nationalist Party Spokesman.
44
"Mr. Mintoff gives go-ahead for Offshore oil drilling,"
The Sunday Times (Malta), 20 July 1980, p. 32.
45
FBIS, Western Europe
, 2 September 1980, p. 11.
46 TU . jIbid.
47
FBIS, Western Europe , 16 August 1979, p. Z4.
48




16 September 1980, p. LI.
and
"Malta and Italy Near Treaty Signing," DMS International
Defense Weekly
,
29 September 1980, p. 3.
Annette Baker-Fox, The Power of Small States (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1959J , p. 5.
FBIS, Western Europe
,













Albert 0. Hirschman, "The Stability of Neutralism: A
Geometric Note," in Economic Theories of International Politics
,





"Under the Oil Gun - Once More", U.S. News and World
Report , 3 November 1980, p. 65.
CHAPTER VI
Nostradamus, as cited by Joseph Micaleff in "Mediter-
ranean Maverick," Round Table 275 (July 1979), p. 251.
Nostradamus was a French astrologer in the 16th century, one
of the most popular of the Renaissance era. His prophecies
have been considered to be sometimes obscure, but this is
explained by some as an indication that the prophecies en-
compass events still far in the future. Micaleff suggests
that the cited passage foretells an invasion of Malta by
Libya, and the destruction of the Catholic Church on the
island.
2 Zartman, p. 122.
3
"Mintoff Offer," The Daily Telegraph , 24 June 1980.
4
"Mr. Mintoff Gives Go-Ahead for Offshore Oil Drilling,"





Selected issues from the following:
The Christian Science Monitor
The Daily Telegraph (London)
The Financial Times (London)
The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western Europe
The Guardian (London)
The International Herald Tribune
The New York Times
The Times (London)
The Times (Malta)
The Sunday Times (London)
The Sunday Times (Malta)
GOVERNMENTAL PUBLICATIONS
British
British Central Office of Information. Malta: Central Office
of Information Reference Pamphlet #63"! London: H.M.
Stationery Office, 1964.
. Malta: Independence Constitution 1964. London:
H.M. Stationery Office, 1964.
Her Majesty's Stationery Office. Proposed Agreement on Mutual
Defense and Assistance Between the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and




. Agreement Between the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
"
Government of Malta with respect to the Use of Military-
Facilities in Malta . London: H.M. Stationery Office,
1972.
Malta
The Central Bank of Malta. Annual Report 1979 . Valletta:
Union Press, 1980.
. Quarterly Report March 1980 . Valletta: Union
Press, 198tH
. Quarterly Report June 1980 . Valletta: Union
Press, 19tJT.
Central Office of Statistics. Annual Abstract of Statistics
1978, No. 32 . Valletta: Government Printing Press, 1980.
Department of Information. Labour Manifesto: "Forward in
Peace ." Valletta: Government Printing Press, 1976.
. Malta Handbook 1976 . Valletta: Government
Printing Press , 1976.
Office of the Prime Minister. Development Plan for Malta
1973-1980 Supplement . Valletta: Central Office of
Statistics Printing Division, 1977.
,
Economic Division. Economic Report 1979 . Valletta:
Government Printing Press, 1979
.
Economic Survey 1978 . Valletta: Government
Printing Press , 1979.
ARTICLES
Brown, Neville. "Can Malta Remain Part of the Western Alliance?"
New Middle East 37 (October 1971):9-11.
Collins, Henry. "Malta's Economy." The World Today 2 3 (May
1967):179-184.
Cottrell, Alvin J. "Malta: The Future of a Navy Base."
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (October 1958): 29-37.
"The Cross Maltese." Time, 19 July 1971.
100

Dowdall, J. "Mintoff's Malta: Problems of Independence.
"
The World Today 2 8 (May 1972) : 189-195.
Frendo, Henry. "Maltese Political Parties (1880-1978)."
Azad Perspectiv 6 (January-March) : 32-47.
Hibbert, Christoper. "The Seige of Valletta, 1798-1800."
History Today 23 (February 1973): 84-93.
Hoch, Karl W.
,
Jr. "The Luftwaffe and Malta: A Case of
"Hercules" Chained." Aerospace History 23 (1976) : 94-100.
Holley, Charles. "The Struggle for Bases in the Mediterranean."
Middle East 26 (December 1976): 38-40.
Jones, Huw R. "The Backward Glance from Malta." Geographical
Magazine 44 (March 1972) : 372-374.
King, Russell. "The Changing Role of Malta's Dockyards."
Geography 281 (November 1978) : 363- 366.
. "Recent Developments in the Political and Econo-
mic Geography of Malta." Tjidschrift voor Economische en
Sociale Geografie 70:5 (1979) :258-271.
Latour, Charles, "The Withdrawal from Malta." NATO's Fifteen
Nations 22 (August-September 1977) : 96- 102
.
"Malta and Italy near Treaty Signing." DMS International
Defense Weekly . 29 September, 1980, p. 3~!
Mallia, Michael J. "Malta's Relations with the EEC." Azad
Perspectiv 8 (July-September 1979): 5-16.
Micaleff, Joseph V. "Mediterranean Maverick." The Round
Table 275 (July 1979) : 238-251.
Otaqui, Shakib, "Malta: A MEED Special Report." Middle
East Economic Digest (May 1980): -entire issue
Richardson, David B. "Malta: the Rock that may Trip Qadhafi."
U.S. News and World Report . 23 July 1979, pp. 40-41.
Wriggins, W. Howard. "To the Highest Bidder: Malta, Britain
and NATO." The Round Table 258 (April 1975) : 167-185.
Young, B.S. "The Maltese Islands: Economic Problems and
Prospects for Industrial Development." The Geographical




Baker-Fox, Annette. The Power of Small States . Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1959
.
Berry, James N. "The Political Alignment and Strategic
Importance of Malta." Thesis, U.S. Naval War College
School of Command and Staff, 1970.
Catholic Encyclopedia . 1913 ed. , s.v. "Malta."
Copley, Gregory R. , ed. "Malta." Defense and Foreign Affairs
Handbook . London: Copley and Associates , 1980.
Dobie, Edith. Malta's Road to Independence . Norman: Univ-
ersity of Oklahoma Press, 1967.
Encyclopaedia Britannica . 1974 ed. , s.v. "Malta."
Hirschman, Albert 0. "The Stability of Neutralism: A
Geometric Note." In Economic Theories of International
Politics, edited by Bruce M. Russett. Chicago: Markham
Publishing Co., 1968.
Ikle, Fred C. How Nations Negotiate . New York: Harper and
Row, 1964.
Lytle, James H. "The Strategic Importance of Malta to the
United States." Thesis, U.S. National Defense University,
1972.
The New Catholic Encyclopedia . 1967 ed. , s.v. "Malta." By
A. Bonnici.
Rothstein, Robert L. Alliances and Small Powers . New York:
Columbia University Press, 1968.
Zartman, I. William. The 50% Solution . Garden City: Anchor
Books, 1976.
Zumwalt, Elmo R. , Jr. On Watch . New York: Quadrangle/The
New York Times Book Co. , 1976.
Miscellaneous Works
Mangion, Patrick. The End of an Island Fortress: Malta 1979 .
Valletta: Lux Printing Press, 1979
.
Mintoff, Prime Minister Dom. Speech to the Conference of
Progressive Socialist Parties and Organizations of the




Speech at the University of Athens, 7-8 April
1976
. Valletta: Government Printing Press, 1976.
The Nationalist Party of Malta. The Nationalist Party's Views
on Basic Foreign Policy Issues . Pieta' , Malta: Press
Release, 29 March 1978.
NATO Information Service. NATO Facts and Figures 1978 .
Brussells: NATO Information Service, 1978.
Report by the Committee on Defense and Armaments , Western
European Union; Security in the Mediterranean: Ass~embly
of the WEU
,
24th Ordinary Session, 1st Part. Document
776, 31 May 1978.
INTERVIEWS
Interviews were carried by the author and others with offi
cials of the Maltese Government, past and present,






1. Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 0142
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
3. Department Chairman, Code 56
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
4. Professor David S. Yost, Code 56Yo
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
5. Professor Robert Looney, Code 56Lx
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
6. Professor Boyd Huff, Code 56Hf
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
7. LT James S. Cooper, USN
ASWOC Sigonella
U.S. Naval Air Facility
FPO New York 09523
8. Professor Randall Siverson
Department of Political Science
University of California, Davis
Davis, California 95616
9. Professor Arvid Pardo
University of Southern California
Institute for Marine and Coastal Studies
University Park




10. LCDR Paul S. Giarra 1
Navigation Department
USS Midway (CV-41)
FPO San Francisco 96631
11. LT Mark H. Crouter 1
Patrol Squadron Thirty-One
Naval Air Station
Moffett Field, California 94035
105

Cooper / 90//: n





c.l Malta: A paradigm





3 2768 001 02276 7
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
